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Chapter I: Introduction
Abstract
Democratic backsliding is a gradual process that results from changes in formal political
institutions and informal political practices that significantly affect how citizens engage with the
state (Lust and Waldner, 2015: 7). Even though such a phenomenon may occur in different types
of democracies, there is always a threshold that determines whether the state will completely
backslide to autocracy or conserve being a “minimal democracy”. For instance, a current model of
democratic backsliding is Turkey; a state which has been experiencing a decline in basic civil
liberties, political rights and freedoms. According to Freedom House, from 2002 to 2020, Turkey’s
“political environment” has decreased from 23 to 31 (on a scale of 0 to 40, 40 being the worst);
moreover, its “global freedom” has deteriorated to 32 (on a scale of 100, 100 being the worst),
which labeled it “not free”, compared to being “partly free” in 2002 (Freedom House, 2020).
Indeed, the literature indicates that such decline mostly stemmed from Erdoğan’s personalization
of institutions and control of the military’s political power after the attempted coup of July 2016.
Nevertheless, when examining the literature on democratization, studies reveal that undermining
the political influence of the military is crucial to consolidate democracy, yet in the Turkish case
that did not happen (Droz-Vinznet, 2014: 668). Accordingly, an emerging puzzle is: why does a
regime continue to backslide from democracy despite de-politicizing its military? How do other
personalized institutions, within a state, determine the outcome of democratic transitions? Looking
at Turkey under Erdoğan and the AKP1, this thesis aims to examine the causes of democratic
backsliding in relation to the de-politicization of the military.

1

The AKP: The Justice and Development Party, known in Turkey by its Turkish acronym AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma
Partisi).
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Keywords: democratic backsliding; politicization of the military; personalization of institutions;
authoritarian legacy.
Conceptual Framework
Before examining the theoretical part of the thesis, a conceptual debate will be
demonstrated then key terms will be defined. To begin with, there is growing uncertainty on how
we should name the phenomenon “opposite to democratization”, how many distinct forms it can
take in the empirical reality, and consequently how relevant and worrisome it is. Three commonly
used concepts vary in degrees of differences when describing “the moving away” from democracy:
“backsliding, breakdown/decay and autocratization” (Luhrmann and Lindberg, 2018: 7).
However, for the purpose of this thesis, I abide by the term backsliding, arguing that democracies
can lose democratic traits without necessarily breaking down or becoming autocracies. It should
also be emphasized that my conception of democracy adheres to Dahl’s “procedural minimal
democracy” which offers seven conditions for a modern democracy to be present:

1. Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected
officials.
2. Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which coercion
is comparatively uncommon.
3. Practically all adults have the right to vote in the election of officials
4. Practically all adults have the right to run for elective offices in the government, though
age limits may be higher for holding office than for the suffrage.
5. Citizens have a right to express themselves without the danger of severe punishment on
political matters broadly defined, including criticism of officials, the government, the
regime, the socioeconomic order, and the prevailing ideology.
6. Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information. Moreover, alternative
sources of information exist and are protected by law.
7. To achieve their various rights, including those listed above, citizens also have a right to
form relatively independent associations or organizations, including independent political
parties and interest groups (Dahl, 1982: 10-11).

In general, those seven conditions capture the essence of a procedural democracy; however, I also
include the additional two conditions proposed by Schmitter and Karl (1991), which are perceived
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as implicit conditions for the prior seven conditions. These two conditions are, firstly, the ability
of the elected leaders to exercise their constitutional rights without being subject to intervention
from informal and unelected opposition (the military junta, entrenched civil servants, or elites who
can veto decisions made by the people’s representatives (Schmitter and Karl, 1991: 81). The
second condition is the importance of having a self-governing polity that can act independently of
the constraints present by the predominant political system (Schmitter and Karl, 1991: 82). In other
words, modern democracy offers a variety of competitive means to express interests and values associational, partisan, territorial, collective and individual in which all are eventually brought to
practice (Schmitter and Karl, 1991: 78). This chimes with Aziz Huq and Tom Ginsburg’s use, in
their recent paper, of the term “constitutional liberal democracy” to include “the civil and political
rights employed in the democratic process, and the availability of neutral electoral machinery, and
the stability, predictability, and publicity of legal regime usually captured in the term rule of law”
(Huq and Ginsburg, 2018: 87). Indeed, Huq and Ginsburg’s approach reflects a broad and general
consensus among researchers and practitioners; for instance, the Freedom House report of 2016
Populists and Autocrats observed how democracy advocates limit themselves to just elections and
refrain from other core pillars of democracy (Freedom House, 2017).

Though there is no doubt that there is a significant contestation on the conception of
democracy, the purpose is not to acknowledge this contestation, but to diagnose the process
opposite to democracy. Accordingly, the reason behind not adhering to the concept of “democratic
decay” is because it is, arguably, used with long-established or consolidated democracies (Daly,
2017: 10). Hence, it will not be possible to apply it to the selected case study: Turkey, which is
often claimed that it never had consolidated because democracy has never been the “only game in
town” (Huq and Ginsburg, 2018: 101). In fact, it is more relevant to adhere to the concept of
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“backsliding” introduced by Nancy Bermeo in explaining the “move-away” from democracy.
Bermeo asserts that backsliding can lead to different endpoints at different speeds as it can
“constitute democratic breakdown or simply the serious weakening of existing democratic
institutions for undefined ends,” this backsliding “yields situations that are fluid and ill-defined,
taking action to defend democracy becomes particularly difficult" (Bermeo 2016: 6). Additionally,
Lührmann and Lindberg define democratic backsliding as a “deterioration of qualities associated
with democratic governance, within any regime” (Luhrmann and Lindberg, 2018: 8).

Another concept that is important to define is the politicization of the military; a politicized
military is an institution in which “a significant proportion of military men consider it appropriate
for the military to be involved in overall government and even to be markedly influential in specific
concerns involving the national security” (Miranda, 1992: 7). Although the process of
politicization does not automatically exclude a constitutional mindset that sets the possibility of
supporting the civilian authority, it confines boundaries to this constitutionalism (Miranda, 1992:
7). Besides, the indicators and activities of a politicized military vary, from attempts to enhance
their political position within the framework of a civilian government to those which outrightly
attempt to seize political power, as in the case of military coups (Miranda, 1992: 7). In this regard,
the former definitions aim to serve the core arguments of the thesis and help to avoid sliding into
a conceptual trap or stretching.

Theoretical Framework
The research framework of this thesis is not derived solely from one theoretical model due
to the complexity of having one inclusive theory that considers the institutional and political
context, and sequences of events behind the current trend of democratic backsliding; nevertheless,
to establish a causal relationship, the case study pursues a historical path-dependent approach. The
6

path-dependent explanation integrates different levels of analysis, which regards institutions 2 as
mediatory units between the structure and agency (Mahoney, 2001: 111). Mahoney suggests that
path-dependency occurs when “the choices of key actors at critical juncture points lead to the
formation of institutions that have self-reproducing properties” (Mahoney, 2001:111). These
institutions are important to succeeding political development because their persistence affects the
outcomes of regime; hence, in this approach, key actors at critical junctures 3 initiate more
deterministic causal processes that eventually lead to processes of political development
(Mahoney, 2001:112). Mahoney lists the analytical components in terms of sequential stages; in
the first stage: antecedent historical conditions that influence the choices of actors; secondly, the
critical junctures which refer to the “choice points” when a particular action is adopted among two
or more alternatives; thirdly, structural persistence, the stage which institutions are formed;
fourthly, reactive sequences which are the result of reactions and counter-reactions to those
institutions formed; finally, regime outcome, which is the final political development that depends
on the resolution of the conflict or prevailing arrangements (Mahoney, 2001: 112-113).

Institutions are “humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. Corollary, they structure incentives in
human exchange, whether political, social or economic” (Söyler, 2015: 30).
3
Critical juncture: defined as “a key choice point or a particular option (e.g., a specific policy, institution, coalition,
or a government) that is selected from among two or more alternatives” (Mahoney, 2001: 112). The critical
junctures can vary from choices characterized by a high degree of individual preference to choices that are
embedded in earlier occurrences (Mahoney, 2001: 113).
2
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Figure 1: Excerpted from Mahoney (2001) “Path-Dependent Explanations of Regime Change: Central
America in Comparative Perspective”. p.113

Thus, in relating path-dependency to my case study, my explanatory figure is divided into
two “path-dependencies” to demonstrate the impact of “path-dependency of institution (1)” on the
“path-dependency of institution (2)” and vice-versa.

Figure 2: Own compilation after Mahoney’s (2001) path-dependent explanation of regime change. P.113

Literature Review
The Decline of Democracy Worldwide

8

In the absence of a common understanding of the “worrisome signs” by Freedom House in
2005, the literature on democratization and its challenges has been divided in explaining the
current alarming claims regarding the acceleration of a democratic erosion process (Cassani and
Tomini, 2018: 3). Indeed, the processes opposite to democratization have been highlighted more
especially after the Freedom House report considered 2017 as the 12th consecutive year of a
worldwide decline in political freedom, the worst decline in years as stated by the Economist
Intelligence Unit (Cassani and Tomini, 2018: 3). According to Anna Lührmann, “Media
autonomy, freedom of expression, and the rule of law have undergone the greatest decline among
democracy metrics in recent years," hence, "this worrisome trend makes elections less meaningful
around the world." (Jacobs, 2018). As described by Luhrmann, this growing trend of
“autocratization”4 has been evident as almost 24 counties have been backsliding from liberal
democracy5. Interestingly, under the current autocratization trend, electoral institutions and
practices remain robust, yet media freedom, freedom of expression and alternative sources of
information, and the rule of law are undermined (Luhrmann et al, 2017: 1336).
Nevertheless, it is still debated if the world is currently facing a reverse wave or not,
because on the one hand, the empirical data does not fully prove that a rising wave is occurring,

4

Autocratization: Luhrmann defines autocratization in this context as “the backsliding away from democracy
towards autocracy”, other definitions are introduced, for example: autocratization is a “process of regime change
towards autocracy that makes politics increasingly exclusive and monopolistic, and political power increasingly
repressive and arbitrary (Luhrmann and Lindberg, 2018:10). Some authors used “autocratization” and
“backsliding” interchangeably because the both imply a loss of democratic quality and changes towards increasing
and different levels of authoritarianism.
5

Liberal Democracy: a full-fledged democracy that entails “a commitment to liberal values such as the protection
of key rights and civil liberties, as well as a willingness to use the institutions of liberal democracy to effect political
change” (Foa and Moank, 2016:8). Additionally, such a democracy follows the tradition of Almond and Verba’s
classic ‘The Civic Culture’ which emphasizes key political values like civil rights (Foa and Moank, 2016).
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as stated earlier it is only occurring in 24 countries. On the other hand, the increasing number of
hybridizations and losses of democratic quality 6 are indicators for a possible upcoming reverse
wave (Eichhor, 2016). Furthermore, the research is invigorated by the fact that not all countries
that previously were considered in transition ever made it to “full democracy” as many introduced
democratic institutions, but reasonable doubts concerning the democratic quality remain (Eichhor,
2016). Hence, in the absence of a shared understanding that can describe the process opposite to
democratization, Cassani and Tomini (2018), presented in their paper a suggested framework for
the comparative analysis, specifically identifying “political participation, public contestation and
executive limitation as the main dimensions of regime variance” (Cassani and Tomini, 2018: 1).
Concerning the conceptual difficulty of the aforementioned phenomenon, several concepts
and terms have been introduced, which is particularly challenging because many of these concepts
overlap. According to Cassani and Tomini (2018), some scholars focus their concepts narrowly on
cases of “democratic breakdown” (Svolik 2015), “overthrow” (Huntington, 1991), “death”
(O’Donnell, 1992), or “failure” (Kapstein and Converse, 2008). Others consider episodes of
“democratic backsliding” (Bermeo, 2016), “decay” (Shedler, 1998), “deterioration” (Economist
Intelligence Unit), “recession” 7 (Diamond, 2015) and “erosion” (Bermeo, 2016). For the purpose
of this thesis, I abide by the latter category of “milder” terms because they imply that although

6

Democratic Quality: Although it is a challenging concept to measure, I abide by Diamond and Morlino definition
which stresses on the “eight dimensions of democratic quality”: (1) rule of law; (2) participation; (3) competition;
(4) vertical accountability; (5) horizontal accountability; (6) freedom; (7) equality; and (8) responsiveness
(Campbell, 2008:24).
7 Democratic Recession: According to Larry Diamond, democratic recession encompasses four categories, “a
deepening of authoritarianism in non-democratic states; an acceleration in the breakdown of democratic regimes;
a decline in the stability or quality of democracy in younger democracies; and a decline in the vigor of longestablished democracies, both in their internal democratic performance and in their faith in, and willingness to
engage in, democracy promotion abroad” (Daly,2017: 2).
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some autocratic processes might happen in democracies, a full-fledged transition to autocracy may
still not take place. Moreover, the list of concepts includes even softer concepts like “worsening”
and “decline” (Freedom House) or “deconsolidation” 8 (Foa and Mounk, 2016). A further obstacle
in this debate lies in the proliferation of labels concerning how they relate or contrast to each other;
for example, some scholars, arguably, include military coups and disruptive events in referring to
“democratic backsliding”, while others compare “democratic backsliding” with “democratic
breakdown” (Cassani and Tomini, 2018:4).
Another argument presented in the literature is how the game of “electoral autocrats” 9 has
changed, and although an autocrat is a strong label to refer to rulers or state officials in
democracies, it is relevant when applying it to the president in Turkey, due to the autocratic laws
he and his entourage implement. Luhrmann and Lindberg (2018) argue that electoral autocrats
secure their competitive advantage through indirect tactics such as “censoring and harassing the
media, restricting civil society and political parties and undermining the autonomy of election
management bodies” (Luhrmann and Lindberg, 2018:6). Indeed, aspiring autocrats borrow and
learn their tactics from each other because it is less risky than abolishing the multi-party elections
altogether (Luhrmann and Lindberg, 2018:6). Thus, one can claim that the current wave is more
clandestine, compared to earlier “autocratic waves”, because around 40% of contemporary
autocrats do not change the formal rules (Luhrmann and Lindberg, 2018: 21).

8

Deconsolidation: Democratic deconsolidation is a term offered by Foa and Moank (2016-2017) to describe the
phenomenon opposite to consolidation. They use Linz and Stepan definition of “democratic consolidation” when
democracy is the “only game in town”. Hence, deconsolidation is “concerned not with the extent of democratic
rule but rather with the durability of democratic rule” (Foa and Moank, 2017:10)
9

This label is used by several scholars in the literature including Luhrmann and Lindberg (2016), Cassani and
Tomini (2018). Nevertheless, “electoral autocracy” is a term used when multiparty elections are held and some
political and civil liberties exist but their meaningfulness is undermined by government repression, censorship, and
intimidation (Luhrmann et al, 2017: 1327).
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How Democracies Die?
There has been a long debate over how democracies die; nevertheless, the main factor that
most scholars focus on is coup d’état. According to Nancy Bermeo, there are different forms of
democratic backsliding over time, yet, we are now faced with more vexing forms that are
legitimated through the institutions prioritized by democracy advocates (Bermeo, 2016: 6).
Overall, the democratic backsliding trends have changed drastically since the Cold War, as the
current trends in backsliding reflect the slow progress of democracy and not its demise; those
trends include promissory coups, executive aggrandizement and strategic manipulation (Bermeo,
2016). The first persistent form of backsliding Bermeo addresses is promissory coups, which is a
kind of coup that “frames the ouster of an elected government as a defense of democratic legality
and makes a public promise to hold elections and restore democracy as soon as possible” (Bermeo,
2016: 8). Indeed, nowadays coup-makers emphasize that their intervention is a necessary step
toward restoring a new improved democratic order, and mostly this claim is spoken out in their
speeches; hence, the percentage of successful coups under the category of promissory coups has
risen from 35% to 85% (Bermeo, 2016: 9). Moreover, after analyzing the aftermath of twelve
successful promissory coups that took place in democracies between 1990 and 2012, only few
states managed to conduct competitive elections and few have paved their way for improved
democratic systems (Bermeo, 2016: 9). For instance, in the case of Haiti, 1990, the coup was
justified by calling for a correction of the democratic process, yet the military soon never kept that
promise (Bermeo, 2016: 9). In addition, the other cases: Gambia (1994), Pakistan (1999), Fiji
(2006) and Honduras (2009), all have proved that elections are not a reliable route to democratic
restoration as all the elections that have followed the promissory coups turned out to be in favor
for those who backed the coups or the actual coups’ perpetrators (Bermeo, 2016: 9). Indeed, even
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though promissory coups initially raise positive expectations at home and abroad, those
expectations have mostly proved to dash (Bermeo, 2016: 9). The second persistent form of
backsliding is Executive aggrandizement. This form of backsliding occurs when elected executives
succeed in weakening checks and balances through undertaking a series of institutional changes
that prevent the opposition forces to challenge or defy the executive preferences (Bermeo, 2016:
10). The channels through which the institutions are disassembled are usually legal ones, such as
elected constitutional assemblies, referendums or even democratic mandates (Bermeo, 2016: 10).
Indeed, on the one hand, this form of democratic backsliding offered by Bermeo is precisely
relevant to my case study and helps to explain how Turkey, under Erdoğan, is reverting to
autocracy, but on the other hand, it does not completely explain why this reverse is occurring. In
sum, executive aggrandizement slowly slides a state towards autocracy as often the call to change
by opposition and movement leaders is not loud enough because the majority supports the already
taken route (Bermeo, 2016: 14). The third and last persistent form is strategic manipulation. Being
often associated with executive aggrandizement, strategic election manipulation includes a “range
of actions aimed at tilting the electoral playing field in favor of incumbents” (Bermeo, 2016: 14).
Those range of actions includes: sponsoring incumbent campaigns through government funds,
changing the electoral rules, keeping opposition candidates off the ballot and hampering voter
registration; all those actions are conducted in a way that appears to be free of fraud (Bermeo,
2016: 14). Bermeo asserts, “it is strategic in that international, and often domestic, observers are
less likely to catch or criticize it” (Bermeo, 2016: 14). Additionally, it is argued that the
manipulation of elections is a result of international pressure that widely perceives elections as
“the only game in town”; hence, politicians manipulate them and use them as means to legitimize
their rule (Bermeo, 2016: 15).
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Furthermore, Linz’s study on presidential democracies (1990) suggests that presidential
democracies are more prone to breakdown in comparison to parliamentary democracies (Linz,
1990). According to the former study, presidential systems have key features that eventually make
it more likely for the regime to “backslide”. Firstly, presidential constitutions incorporate
contradictory assumptions; on one hand, they create a strong executive system to stand against the
interests of the legislature, and on the other hand, such constitutions reflect strong hidden
personalization of power (Linz, 1990: 54). Secondly, presidentialism imparts rigidity to the
political system in the sense that no electoral means can respond rapidly in the case of a political
crisis (Linz, 1990: 55). Thirdly, such a system is problematic because it operates according to the
rule of “winner-take-all”, which eventually makes democratic politics a zero-sum game and
portends more conflict (Linz, 1990: 56). Another notable feature in presidential systems is that the
“style” of politics mainly results from the characteristics of the presidential office and that
conflates the risk of having an “authoritarian presidential style” (Linz, 1990: 60-66). Additionally,
a presidential regime leaves less room for the exchange of compromises and consensus-building,
which eventually “freezes” the dynamics of any democratic political arena (Linz, 1990: 68).
Accordingly, a lesson drawn from the aforementioned features of the presidential system is that
the institutional design of a state matters, and in the case of Turkey, Erdoğan has utilized such a
system to centralize the state’s institutions and preserve his authority. Furthermore, Larry Diamond
in his recent book, Ill Winds (2019), offers a thought-provoking account of the ongoing
“democratic recession” through offering several case studies that have been on a sharp decline
(Diamond, 2019). Diamond argues that the process of the “death of democracy” has changed
compared to last decades when it was sudden with coups and authoritarian captures; however,
currently, the “death” is gradual and the anti-democratic forces are: constraints of free media, on
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independent courts/institutions and business community (Diamond, 2019: 55). Accordingly, the
precise assessment of the democratic decay/backsliding/reversal in some countries is challenging
because it involves more than one factor; besides, the events and processes that lead to antidemocratic regimes vary (for example, Putin’s removal of opposing oligarch differs from Chavez’s
amendment of the constitution). However, the outcomes are closely the same, as elections become
only an instrument to gain legitimacy and the basic civil and political rights are drastically
exacerbated (Diamond, 2019: 55).
In the case of Turkey, Kirisci and Sloat briefly identify the internal and external drivers that
contribute to democratic backsliding (Kirisci and Sloat: 1). Domestically, it is argued that the
country has been adopting the culture that accepts “big man” rule; hence, Erdoğan’s government
is less attached to civil liberties and rights that are associated with liberal democracy (Kirisci and
Sloat: 1). Additionally, the adoption of exclusionary policies has polarized the society, specifically
after the July 2016 coup attempt that complicated the efforts to preserve shared democratic values
(Kirisci and Sloat: 1). Another domestic reason Kirisci and Sloat identify is the crushing of the
opposition by Erdoğan and the transformation to a heavily centralized presidential system that
further crushed checks and balances (Kirisci and Sloat: 1). On the other hand, externally, Turkey’s
inability to join the EU, followed by the destabilization of the region due to the arrival of 3.5
million Syrian refugees, the attacks of some Turkish cities by ISIS and the ongoing clashes with
the PKK, all played a role in its democratic regression (Kirisci and Sloat: 2). Nevertheless, it is
still difficult to pinpoint a precise date when Erdoğan’s authoritarian behavior became evident and
the question is whether the aforementioned “drivers” are real factors or just means to legitimize
his authoritarian rule?

15

Indeed, many scholars argue that Turkey has taken a turn towards authoritarianism, specifically
with the series of consecutive autocratic laws, reforms and events that have taken place for the last
decade (Duran, 2018). The failure of democracy in Turkey, according to Duran, can be seen as
part or the “new reverse wave” that Larry Diamond identified between 2000 and 2014 (Duran,
2018: 99). Given that, the process of “autocratization” in Turkey can be summed up in the various
institutional changes and a number of contingent and informal changes starting from the June 2015
parliamentary elections, the 2016 attempted coup d’état, and the 2017 referendum (Duran, 2018:
98). This “autocratization” is fundamentally related to the concentration of executive power in the
figure of president Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) since 2012, which has
manifested itself as the longest period of a party’s continuous rule in Turkey since 1950 (Duran,
2018: 100). In fact, the absolute control of the AKP through the presentation of a strong ideology,
consecutive electoral victories (including presidential and parliamentary), control of institutions
(like judicial and legislative institutions), social networks and media censorship have all led to the
repression of freedom and the erosion of check and balances in the state’s branches and
government’s accountability to voters (bipartisan policy, 2014).
Furthermore, some reports highlight the corruption alleged by Erdoğan and his close associates
in increasing the state’s power and insulating its accountability (bipartisan policy, 2014:6). Pierini
adds that the new reform of the electoral law, which brought forward the elections to June 2018
instead of November 2018, embodied a political strategy that gave more control over ballot stations
to the government officials vis-á-vis party representatives (Pierini, 2018: 7). Moreover, the jailing
of various deputies, mayors, journalists, policemen, teachers and the opposition, in general, has
significantly affected the quality of democracy; in other words, the system Erdoğan created,
managed to establish a dysfunctional government in terms of civil liberties and rights (Duran, 2018
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and Pierini, 2018). Lastly, White states how the polarization and control cycles have hindered
productivity and social integration, which eventually “help keep strongman leaders like Erdoğan
in place” (White, 2017: 36).
The Politicization of the Military and Democratic Politics
Throughout history, there has been an ongoing debate on the role of the military and its
impact on democratic politics. William Thomson (1973, 1980) formulated a model “corporate
grievance” that suggests the “self-interests” of the military institutions in ending civilian rule
(Tusalem, 2014: 483). He states that the military aims to end democratic rule when its self-interests
are not served by the national governments or when the state tries to only abide by austerity
measures “imposed by domestic, external or populist forces,” that threaten the military (Tusalem,
2014: 483). Aguero (1995, 1997) additionally asserts that the key to maintaining a consolidated
democracy is to undermine the authority of the military and subordinate it to civilian rule (Tusalem,
2014: 484). Moreover, Miranda (1992) examines the relationship between the politicization of the
military and its effect on democratic transition. He argues that mastering the military to serve under
the constituted authorities has always challenged civilian regimes; thus the liberal democratic
theory emphasizes the importance of establishing limitations on the role of the military and putting
it under civilian officials and agencies (Miranda, 1992: 6). According to Miranda, various reasons
explain the phenomenon of military politicization; some of them are the fragility of post-colonial
orders, absence of traditional institutions that balance and control the “guardian-role-oriented
military”, and the corruption of civilian authorities who are not able to govern (Miranda, 1992: 7).
Indeed, most of the studies that have been conducted to examine the relationship between the role
of the military and the survival of democracy assert that it is vital to restraining the power of the
military for democracy to survive (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Huntington, 1996).
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Nevertheless, it is still puzzling why Erdoğan is following an autocratic path despite his
current control over the military as he already managed to reduce its legal and institutional power
in decision-making and criminalized any intervention (Esen & Gumuscu, 2016: 1584-1585). One
way to solve this puzzle is to first measure the politicization of the military, and secondly to look
at the history of democracy in Turkey; thus, chapters two and three examine more the later issues.
Research Question, Hypotheses and Variables
After reviewing part of the literature on democratic backsliding and Turkey, this thesis
aims to lead to a better understanding of why the process of democratic backsliding has taken place
in Turkey despite depoliticizing the military as an institution. Hence, the thesis research question
is:
RQ: Why is Turkey reverting to autocracy despite de-politicizing the military?
H1: Restrainaing the power of the military does not gurantee the survival of democracy.
H2: The autocratic policies by Erdoğan are influenced by the historical experience of
Turkey10.
H3: The personalization of institutions 11 is a key cause of democratic backsliding in Turkey.
In this thesis, the dependent variable is the reverse to autocracy/democratic backsliding function.
The independent variables are the politicization of the military (IV1), personalization of institutions
(IV2) and the historical experience (IV3).

10

Referring specifically to the authoritarian legacy and the role of the Turkish deep state.

11personalization

of politics is a term developed by Rahat and Sheafer, according to them, “personalization should
be seen as a process in which the political weight of the individual actor in the political process increases over
time, while the centrality of the political group (i.e., political party) declines” (Rahat and Sheafer, 2007: 65).
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Research Design and Methodology
The research will be addressed through process tracing. The term “process tracing”
originally derived from the field of cognitive psychology in the late 1960s. yet in 1979, Alexander
L. George appropriated the term to describe it as “the use of evidence from within case studies to
make inferences about historical explanations” (Bennett and Checkel, 2015: 5). In fact, “process
tracing” is a mean to examine the intermediate steps in a process to make inferences about
hypotheses on how that process took place; thus, Bennett and George defines it as “the use of
“histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal
process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is, in fact, evident in the sequence and values of
the intervening variables in that case” (George and Bennett, 2005: 6), adding, “the process-tracing
method attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal
mechanism – between an independent variable [or variables] and the outcome of the dependent
variable” (Bennet and Checkel, 2015:6). With those definitions in hand, it is important to note that
process tracing is highly dependent on historical explanations, and that does not mean it is only a
detailed sequence of events; rather, it draws on different theories that aim to explain each important
step that contributes to causing the outcome (Bennet and Checkel, 2015:8).
The reason behind adhering to this method is that quite often the events that lie between
the variables are not fully determined by those specified variables; hence, analyzing the evidence
on processes, sequences and conjunctures of events within a case allows one to either develop
hypotheses about the causal mechanisms that might explain the case or generate additional testable
implications (Bennet and Checkel, 2015:7-8). Another analytical advantage of using this method
is that it draws close attention to the incentives generated by the institutional, organizational and
societal context including case-specific knowledge of “formal and informal institutional structures,
patterns of political competition, economic and social conditions, and details of the substantive
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issue at hand” (Bennet and Checkel, 2015: 72). Thus, employing this method will help solve the
thesis puzzle and trace how Turkey is still abiding by its democratic narrative despite employing
a key “authoritarian arm” and structuring other institutions in favor of the ruler and his political
party. Moreover, to examine the phenomenon of democratic backsliding, this approach is the most
practical for evaluating the competing theoretical explanations.
Case Selection:
The thesis is a single-case study; it is defined as an intensive study of a single unit to
understand an issue or refinement of theory (Berg-Schlosser, 2012: 55). Although conclusions
from a single case are not enough to verify or falsify theories, the accumulation of knowledge
derived from such case studies could in the long run add or determine the fate of broader
generalizations (Berg-Schlosser, 2012: 55). Moreover, since the core argument of the thesis is that
the politicization of the military matters for the future of democracy, the Turkish case study is
significantly relevant as it also presents an empirical example of the possible relevance of factors
for the survival or breakdown of democracy.
Obtaining Data
The data was collected through secondary sources, using already existing literature and
scholarly work on:
-

The study of democratization and autocracy.

-

The relationship between democracy and the politicization of the army.

-

The steps through which Turkey has moved to autocracy.

In addition, official statements of President Erdoğan published in newspaper articles, as well as,
reports on the status of Turkey, will be observed.
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Organizational Structure of the Thesis
The thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter provides an introductory overview
of what the thesis is examining; this includes the research puzzle and question, the hypotheses, the
theoretical and conceptual framework, the literature review and the methodology.
The second chapter is offers a historical background on the role of the military and its
impact on democratic politics, as different theoretical explanations will be presented to examine
the causal relationship between the politicization of the military and the survival or demise of
democracy.
The third chapter will examine the Turkish model since the establishment of the republic
in 1923, and trace the historical events to determine how the democratic project has begun and
what processes have led to its deterioration.
The fourth chapter is the core of this study as it aims to explain the reversal to autocracy
under Erdoğan and the AKP. The analysis will help to determine the turning point through which
this reversal has occurred as it will be looked at the empirical evidence behind the restructuring of
the Turkish political and legal institutions, military and media outlets.
Finally, chapter five provides a conclusion of the study and a restatement of the key
findings.
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Chapter II: The Military and Democratic Politics
The civilian control of the military is one of the key conditions for the consolidation of
democratic institutions (Croissant et al, 2011). Indeed, in the subject of civil-military relations12,
various theories tend to explain the success or failure of civil control and its relation to democracy.
Civil control is defined as the ability of the exclusive authority to decide and implement national
policies on the military, which has an autonomous power that does not go beyond those already
defined by the civilians (Croissant et al, 2011: 77). Thus, the term “civilians” refers to those
individuals and organizations in the state apparatus that have the authority to formulate, implement
and oversee political decisions, whereas the term “military” is narrowly defined as a permanent
state organization that is authorized by law to use coercive power to provide security for the state
and the society against any external threat (Croissant et al, 2011: 77). To evaluate H1:
Restrainaing the power of the military does not gurantee the survival of democracy, this chapter
aims to outline key explanations on the impact of the politicization of the military on the survival
or demise of democracy (democratic outcome). Followingly, different theories about the impact
of institutional changes in civil-military relations will be examined to understand the role of the
military in the Turkish political system.
The Politicization of the Military and Democratic Politics
Edmund Burke once said, “an armed disciplined body is, in its essence, dangerous to
liberty” (Kemp and Hudlin, 1992: 8). At first glance, the conflict between the military and the
survival/consolidation of democracy has been always obvious and most studies have emphasized

12

civil-military relations is described as a continuum of political decision-making power with full civilian control
and complete military dominance over all political structures, processes, and policies at the respective endpoints of
the scale; cases in which political decision-making power is divided between civilians and the military are
positioned somewhere along this continuum (Croissant et al, 2011: 78).
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the importance of restraining the power of the military for democracy to survive (Linz and Stepan,
1996; Huntington, 1996; Barany, 1997; Agüero, 1998; Schedler, 1998). For instance, Schedler in
his study (1998) posits the risk of former authoritarian governments that had military regimes or
strong politicized military to democratically collapse; this occurs when civilian governments face
a legitimacy problem and the military tends to intervene to reassert itself either through direct
intervention in politics or an outright coup (Schedler, 1998: 96). Thus, eventually, such tendencies
lead to uncertainty and may lead to democratic decay/erosion (Schedler, 1998: 96). In other cases,
the military intervenes by rigging elections, reversing democratic reforms by supporting civilian
elites who have a similar ideological connection or by performing multiple coup plots, which result
in making the government chronically unstable and accordingly compels it to curtail basic civil
freedoms and rights (Diamond, 1999: 61-62). Moreover, in other cases, the historical
institutionalism and its role as a vanguard actor provide the justification for the military to
intervene in politics; therefore, according to Diamond, to deepen democracy “the military must be
steadily removed from the political realm” (Diamond, 1999: 113). Similarly, Agüero asserts the
importance of subordinating the military to the civilian authority, as it is considered one of the key
determinants of a state’s democratic outcome, and indeed the democratic reversals that occurred
in Latin America result from the failure of civilian governments to remove the military from the
executive leadership (Agüero, 1998: 383-404). In addition, earlier Alfred Stepan et al. (1988)
emphasized the importance of including the military in democratization studies because it has been
long neglected, although it is a “central topic of empirical research” (Stepan et al., 1988: 9). The
latter is emphasized by Zultan Barany (1997), stating “the military is the most consequential actor
in post-authoritarian transitions and the success or failure of these processes to a large extent hinges
on its political behavior” (Barany, 1997: 1). Barany (1997) studied the impact of a state’s military
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infrastructure on the quality of democratic transitions; his conclusion is the more professionalized
a state’s military pre-transition, the more likely its democracy will consolidate post-transition like
in the case of Poland and Hungary. On the other hand, the more politicized is the army, the more
turbulent are the transitions, like in the case of Romania (Barany, 1997: 21-43). Moreover, Stepan
(1988) affirmed in his study on Latin America how can some “prerogatives” or “reserved domains”
of the military in post-transitional periods affect consolidation; such prerogatives include: limiting
the presidential decisions on the affairs of the military; allowing the military’s participation in the
executive cabinet; preserving partial autonomy of the military; giving advantages and amnesty to
ex-military officers; prohibiting the prosecution of military officers in civilian courts (Stepan et al,
1988: 94-97). Furthermore, Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) explained how the reserved domains
of the military and their significant control led to stalling the democratic progress in Africa
(Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997: 170). The path dependency is manifested through the
institutional legacies of the militaries and their demand of “reserved domains”, which they refuse
to let go easily post-transition. Accordingly, the likelihood of democratic consolidation for
transitional states with politicized militaries becomes difficult. Lastly, Finer (1962) posed the
question: “Why does the military ever refrain from political intervention?” The answer is
dependent on the nature of civil-military relations within the state (Finer, 1962: 84). Thus, in the
following paragraphs, I aim to explore the different theories and mechanisms of civil control over
the military.

Theorizing Civil-Military Relations
Political scientists have proposed a series of contending theories on civil-military relations,
offering various explanations that range from agent-based to structural and institutional
approaches. Each of these approaches not only aims to provide the factors explaining the success
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or failure of civilian control over the military in democracies but also takes up a fixed position
towards the structure-agency debate (Kuehn and Lorenz, 2011: 231-232). Nevertheless, the
literature has not explicitly addressed the interplay of both structure and agency except recently
through the works of few scholars who integrated different elements from each approach. Hence,
briefly, the four traditional approaches will be demonstrated following an overview of explanations
for the civil-military relationships. To begin with, the agent-based approach emphasizes two
aspects for institutionalizing civilian control; firstly, the military must give up any formal or
informal power it acquired under an authoritarian regime; secondly, civilians have to secure their
authority over former and current “reserved domains” in which the military had held exclusive
institutional autonomy (Kuehn and Lorenz, 2011: 235). Subsequently, the main dimension in
theorizing change of civil-military relations is the identification of the relevant actors who possess
the ability and intention to safeguard or extend the political and institutional autonomy. Similarly,
the ideational approach centers around the subjective aspects of human action and the influence of
culture and actors’ behaviors; for example, “the political socialization of the officer corps or the
degree of social militarization” (Kuehn and Lorenz, 2011: 236). In contrast, a structural approach
looks at the macro-social and political environment; for instance, the level of modernization,
economic performance of the regime and the internal and external threats of the environment
concerning the independent decisions of agents (Kuehn and Lorenz, 2011: 236). Last but not least,
the institutional approach aims to explain the civil-military relations through examining the manmade formal or informal rules, which constitute the institutions of the political system such as: “as
the centralization of decision-making power or the ‘path dependence’ of authoritarian legacies”
(Kuehn and Lorenz, 2011: 236).
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Traditional Approaches
One of the main scholars to theorize and conceptualize civil-military relations is Samuel
Huntington in his famous study “The Soldier and the State” (1957). Huntington argues that
professionalism is the key to both maintain civil-control over the military and at the same time it
is the gate to military autonomy (Huntington, 1957: 80). Hence, his basic methodological
assumption is based on an equilibrium that simultaneously maximizes security while ensuring
civilian control (Huntington, 1957: 80-83). Nevertheless, Huntington’s ideas do little in providing
clear measures that can be used to increase civilian control and, additionally, fails to explain what
may happen if the military disobeys the civilian institution despite its professionalism. Another
theoretician who conceptualized civil-military relations is Morris Janowitz who reviews the impact
of international relations on the relationship between the military and the civilian government
(Janowitz, 1960: 418). According to him, the invention of nuclear weapons has blurred the line
between peace and war, persuading the military to become more politicized through its increasing
interference in the affairs of the civilian government (Janowitz, 1960: 418). Indeed, “as a pressure
group, the military is not a voluntary association acting on the organs of government; on the
contrary, it is an organ of government seeking to develop new techniques for intervening in
domestic politics” (Janowitz, 1960: 365). Therefore, to keep the military under control, Janowitz
advocates several measures such as: increasing the legislative oversight, extending civilian control
and involvement in the military organizations and developing the values and the curriculum of
military education (Janowitz, 1960: 369). However, Samuel Finer provides a different view of
civil-military relations by detailing the means of the military influence and suggesting that
professionalism may render the achievement of civilian control (Finer, 1962: 4). Thus, the military
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adopts the perception of having “a unique duty, a duty of supererogation, to watch over the national
interest,” which allows it to significantly intervene in politics and undermine the power of
governments (Finer, 1962: 63). Furthermore, Finer distinguishes the military motives and “moods”
for intervention which include: nationalist interest, sectional interest and social/individual
interests; yet, for a motive to transform into an actual intervention, it has to be associated with an
emotion (Finer, 1962: 20-50). Indeed, he emphasizes that the level of intervention is dependent on
the nation’s “political culture” and level of development (Finer, 1962: 89). Finer’s theory goes
beyond Huntington and Janowitz's theories in demonstrating the preconditions and motivations of
civil-military control, which helps explain the behaviors of the military. Peter Feaver is another
scholar who argues that all civil-military relations theories fall under one simple paradoxical
“problematique”, which is “the institution created to protect the polity is given sufficient power to
become a threat to the polity” (Feaver, 2003: 4). Feaver emphasizes the dangers of infringing
military influence and addresses the importance of having a strong civilian government even in
the absence of direct military intervention; hence, he uses the principal agency-based theory to
explain the “strategic interaction” and the role of punishment between both actors (Feaver, 2003:
51). Strategic interaction is useful because “the choices civilians make are contingent on their
expectations of what the military is likely to do, and vice versa,” accordingly, this level of
uncertainty pushes both actors to take calculated risks to achieve optimal results (Feaver, 2003:
54). Lastly, Eric Nordlinger and Amos Perlmutter, described as “interventionist scholars”, focus
on the military elites who maintain their influence through establishing power-related networks
(Nordlinger, 1977; Perlmutter, 1981). Nordlinger argues that the actions of the military are driven
by the self-interests of the corporate rather than any wider conception of national interest;
moreover, the military generally intervenes when the civilian government fails to strongly perform
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and loses its legitimacy to protect its corporate interests (Nordlinger, 1977: 65-66). Perlmutter
states that the military’s decision of intervention is purely political. Using the term “praetorianism”
which means: “a situation where the military class of a given society exercises independent
political power within it by virtue of an actual or threatened use of force.” Perlmutter describes the
military’s tendency to intervene in the government to dominate the executive (Perlmutter, 1981:
5). He further distinguishes between two types of “praetorian armies”: “the ruler army” which
exercises direct rule over an extended period of time, and the “arbitrator army” which seeks to
consolidate its political power and indirectly intervene in politics (Perlmutter, 1981: 25-27).
Nevertheless, although Perlmutter’s theory offers us an understanding of different military
scenarios, it fails to offer policy solutions that allow civilian governments to maintain control of
the military.

Integrative Approaches
Throughout the last decade, few scholars have introduced integrative approaches that look
at different factors as: “the mode of transition, the cohesiveness of civilian coalitions vis-à-vis the
military, the strength of public support for democracy, civilian expertise in military issues, and the
international context” (Croissant et al, 2011: 80). Among those scholars is Muthiah Alagappa
(2001) who analyzes the declining political role of the military in Asia through integrating
ideational and agential factors such as “beliefs, power and interests of the key civilian and military
actors” (Alagappa 2001: 63). The struggle Alagappa sees among competing political and military
elites is not limited to one actor, rather, it includes different societal groups and institutions
(Alagappa, 2001: 30-31). Indeed, at first, he relies primarily on a single structural variable which
is the “the weight and role of coercion in governance”; thus, if coercion is a necessary tool for the
implementation of government decisions, the military in return has a stronger position to possess
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more decision-making authority (Alagappa, 2001: 63). Clearly, Alagappa’s argument entails an
integrative model in which he assumes that the structure influences action through producing
actors’ preferences (Alagappa, 2001: 63). Simultaneously, his argument suggests a resource model
that includes “economic, coercive, organizational, as well as, political and ideational components
that merge with beliefs” (Alagappa, 2001: 63). However, it lacks a model of actors’ decisions that
would examine the impact of the discrete action on different outcomes (Kuehn and Lorenz, 2011:
240). Another example of an integrative approach is the study by Felipe Agüero “Soldiers,
Civilians, and Democracy” in which he argues how the bargains between military leadership and
civilian elites, those who reside in the government, determine the development of civil-military
relations in new democracies (Agüero, 1995: 11). Agüero asserts that the reason behind the strive
for autonomy by the military leadership is due to its fear of uncertainty and its aim of preserving
control over internal affairs (Agüero, 1995: 22). Additionally, other institutional factors include
the system of government and the degree of democratic institutionalization in the polity; hence,
Agüero argues that although both presidential and parliamentary systems could tame the military’s
power, civilian elites in presidential systems might encounter more factionalism between the
executive and legislative branches of the government (Kuehn and Lorenz, 2011: 241). On the other
hand, if those civilian elites unite against the military, their power will be strengthened; therefore,
military factionalism is a valuable resource, especially if parts of the military are “professionally”
minded and as a result accept the normative principle of military subordination (Kuehn and Lorenz,
2011: 241). In addition to Agüero and Alagappa, Harold Trinkunas (2005) offers a comprehensive
framework that focuses on the actions of civilians who can reform the initiatives of decisionmaking and maximize their control over the military (Trinkunas, 2005: 10). According to
Trinkunas, civilians tend to choose between four strategies in order to “co-opt, recruit, or
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intimidate a sufficiently large number of military officers into supporting the government’s
agenda”; such strategies include appeasement, monitoring, divide-and-conquer, and sanctioning
(Trinkunas, 2005: 12). All those strategies fall under the umbrella of “regime capacity”, which is
dependent on the strength of civilian institutions and the degree of defense expertise to break the
“old path” of civil-military relations and establish a new one (Trinkunas, 2005: 13-16). Trinkunas,
additionally, emphasizes the importance of institutionalizing secondary resources like ministries,
legislative committees, courts and NGOs (Trinkunas, 2005: 17-19). Lastly, Croissant et al. (2011)
agree with Trinkunas in stating that the chances of institutionalizing civilian control depend to a
great extent on the decisions taken by the civilians; however, they restrict the agential capacity to
political elites who “have the authority to formulate, implement and oversee political decisions”
(Croissant et al., 2011: 77). In this respect, they assume that civilians are generally interested in
expanding their control; yet, the actions of the civilians are not all alike once in power, as both the
mechanisms and “control strategies” differ (Croissant et al., 2011: 83). The types of mechanisms
and control strategies used by the civilians to institutionalize control depend on the political
resources at disposal, as they can range from weak to robust ones (Croissant et al., 2011: 86).

Table 1: excerpted from: Croissant et al., 2011: 86.

As demonstrated in the table, the mechanisms and strategies of civil-military change vary
and in the following paragraph, those mechanisms will be examined in detail to provide a coherent
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explanation of civil-military relations. Firstly, power mechanisms of institutional change are
attempts to adjust the status quo of civil-military relations through power and that occurs when
civilians try to coerce the military into submitting to the newly introduced rules (Croissant et al.,
2011: 86). The corresponding strategies are (a) sanctioning, (b) counterbalancing and (c)
monitoring. Sanctioning is a mean that strengthens the civilian’s supremacy by depriving military
factions and individual officers of their benefits; such a measure includes: “discharge, early
retirement or court-martialing of disloyal officers, summary purges of the officer corps and
“reputational attacks” [that] aim to destroy the social prestige of the armed forces (Croissant et al.,
2011: 86). On the other hand, counterbalancing is dependent on the inter/intra-agency rivalries
among different segments of the security sector and the creation of parallel or additional security
forces outside the military’s chain of command, like presidential guards, parliamentary police and
other security forces under the command of the ministry of interior and the president (Croissant et
al., 2011: 87). Indeed, most authoritarian regimes rely on this strategy to preserve the military’s
subordination (Croissant et al., 2011: 87). The third coercive strategy is monitoring and it mainly
raises the expected cost of military non-compliance by increasing the probability of punishment
by creating surveillance networks and reporting systems inside and outside the military (Croissant
et al., 2011: 87). Moving on to the legitimization mechanisms of institutional change; civil-military
relations occur when civilians transform the normative framework of the military through
institutional change (Croissant et al., 2011: 87). If the former mechanism is successfully applied
through a) ascriptive selection or (b) political socialization, then the military in return tends to
accept the institutional transformation and perceives it as morally right and legitimate (Croissant
et al., 2011: 87). Ascriptive selection is a strategy that reduces the military’s disposition by
promoting officers to top positions, based on ethnic origin, class affiliation, ideological orientation
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and other ties to civilian leaders (Croissant et al., 2011: 87) In contrast, political socialization is a
long-term strategy that aims at transforming the identity of the military through involving political
education, confidence-building measures and training programs to strengthen the acceptance of
democratic civilian control (Croissant et al., 2011: 87). The last mechanism is institutional change
through mechanisms of compensation; this category includes all the civilian attempts to extend
control by granting benefits to the military when it accepts the new institutional framework
(Croissant et al., 2011: 87). Accordingly, the three types of strategies are: (a) appeasement, (b)
acquiescence, and (c) appreciation. Appeasement occurs when civilian elites supply the military
with financial demands; for example, in Indonesia after the transition to democracy, civilians
allowed the military to maintain its various business and economic activities to gather extra
revenues (Croissant et al., 2011: 88). Similarly, acquiescence is a strategy that depends on the
exchange of political subordination, as civilian authorities “refrain from government intrusion on
military prerogatives and institutional autonomy of the military (Trinkunas 2005, 10). Lastly,
appreciation, which is a strategy that creates military loyalty through enhancing the public support
and social acceptance of the armed forces, providing them new roles and missions, and improving
their stance through pro-military propaganda and administrative reforms (Croissant et al., 2011:
88).

In sum, all the aforementioned forms of strategies could be understood as illustrative
examples of the possible concrete actions conducted to change civil-military relations.
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that civilians in civil-military relations make their
decisions based on certain macro-domestic and structural circumstances (e.g. socio-economic
development, military identity, type of political culture and structure of the international system)
in certain institutional settings and under particular historical legacies (Croissant et al., 2011: 90).
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Indeed, David Dessler’s description of the “agency-structure problem” explains how the choices
and strategies of actors “can be realized only in concrete historical circumstances that condition
the possibilities for action and influence its course” (Dessler, 1989: 443). Last but not least, the
use of each strategy depends on the available resources the citizens have; for instance, more robust
strategies demand more resources than less robust strategies (Croissant et al., 2011: 90). By
adopting Mahoney’s path-dependent explanation for institutional change and stability, those three
mechanisms “power, legitimization and compensation” act as means for civilians (change agents)
to break path dependence and make new institutions (Croissant et al., 2011). Overall, Croissant
and his colleagues predict, “that the more robust a strategy, the higher the chance of ‘breaking’ a
path, and the more likely a displacement of existing rules and a substantial increase in civilian
control” (Croissant et al., 2011: 93). Finally, all the aforementioned theories of civil-military
relations offer a broad foundation; however, they take for granted the notion when the military is
institutionalized, democratization or democratic consolidation is given, and the case of Turkey
proves otherwise.

Overview of Civil-Military Relations in Turkey
The military always had a central role in the Turkish state and society; indeed, the
preservation of the state, both internally and externally, has been traditionally missioned to the
military (Haugom, 2019: 3). This legacy, extended from the Ottoman times, was continued in the
modern Turkish Republic as the military has been always perceived by the Turkish society as a
“guarantor of stability” or the “guardian” 13 (Haugom, 2019: 3). Indeed, its prestige at certain times

13

Eric A. Nordlinger defined this guardian role as one in which the military has a governmental control to preserve
the status quo and correct what it perceives as deficiencies (Nordlinger, 1977: 22 in Haugom, 2019: 3). In addition,
Nilüfer Narli revealed how this guardian role permitted the military “to use various forms of intervention, ranging
from a coup to controlling and influencing the civilian political process through formal and informal mechanisms”
(Narli, 2011: 215 in Haugom, 2019: 3).
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was optimum; according to Süleyman Demirel, the late Turkish political leader, “In Turkey, God
first created the military” (Haugom, 2019: 3). Moreover, the military was “the one institution that
repeatedly checked civilian autocratic tendencies, maintained moderation, and ensured the
preservation of the state” (Demir and Bingöl, 2018: 174). Nevertheless, since the end of the Cold
War, the influence of the military in politics has been decreasing and the civil-military relations in
Turkey have evolved; thus, in the following paragraphs, I will first overview the military
interventions before 2002 then demonstrate the factors and dynamics that led to realignment and
evolution of the Turkish Armed Forces (Demir and Bingöl, 2018: 172).

Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the military and the ruling party
(Republican People’s Party, CHP) were considered one strong entity, until 1950, because none of
them was strong enough to suppress the other (Demirel, 2005: 247; Demir and Bingöl, 2018: 175).
Nevertheless, even though there was no clear legislative arrangement defining the army’s position,
Ataturk’s governments used the military as “an instrument of education, social mobilization and
nation-building” (Demir and Bingöl, 2018: 176). In fact, the Turkish military remained
independent and unsubordinated to any constitutional organization till it was subordinated to the
Prime Minister in 1944 and the Ministry of Defense in 1949 (Demir and Bingöl, 2018: 176).
Following a general election in 1950, the single-party government came to an end and the
military’s influence over civilian power declined under the Democrat Party (DP) governments
(Demir and Bingöl, 2018: 177). In fact, during the period between 1950-1960, civilian authorities
relatively exercised more control over the military; hence, this period is viewed as the “highest
level of professionalism” along with strong internal dynamics that greatly impacted civil-military
relations (Demir and Bingöl, 2018: 177). Nevertheless, the means that the DP used to undermine
the political influence of the military, eventually led to more “tight-fisted” actions by the military.
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Indeed, the military had a growing view that the DP is violating the secular principles, in addition
to increasing authoritarian practices by the government to political conflicts (Demir and Bingöl,
2018: 177). Eventually, those conflicts resulted in the coup of May 27, 1960, involving middleranking officers and military-bureaucratic elites who dominated the CHP and feared losing their
ground (Demirel, 2005: 249). After the intervention, the Turkish General Staff (TGS) introduced
several institutional mechanisms to ensure that the upcoming governments abide by their
acceptable bounds; hence, those mechanisms were legitimized by adding them in the new
constitution of 1961 (Jenkins, 2007: 342). Indeed, not only the coup and its aftermath policies
gained widespread support among civilian elites, but also the DP supporters did not show any
serious resistance against the new regime (Demirel, 2005: 249). Thus, the military perceived the
opponents (DP supporters) not as a threat but as a group of people who need to be “educated”
(Demirel, 2005: 249). Even though the 1960s was a period of partial military rule, it was still
perceived as a period of progress in which freedom and civil rights were broadened yet it did not
bring “more democracy” (Demirel, 2005: 249). In fact, towards the end of the 1960s, clashes
between the right and left-wing students escalated, causing domestic disorder, and the government
of the Justice Party (JP), which won the majority in the parliamentary elections of 1965 and 1969,
proved to be inefficient in dealing with the social and economic unrest (Demir and Bingöl, 2018:
178).

Moving towards the 1970s, the government of JP led by Suleyman Demirel resigned and
the military intervened by issuing a memorandum demanding the formation of a technocrat
government (Demirel, 2005: 250). The technocrat government was approved and the political
influence of the military was significant (Demirel, 2005: 250). Towards the end of the 1970s,
Turkey was experiencing tremendous political, social and sectarian turmoil; indeed, at the political
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level, the country was considered almost ungovernable 14 (Demir and Bingöl, 2018: 178). For
instance, “unsuccessful coalition governments followed each other; the society was divided along
the ideological lines; and the parliament could not manage to choose its president after 102
successive attempts,” accordingly, the 1980 coup was welcomed by the Turkish people and the
military managed to restore order at a huge cost (Demir and Bingöl, 2018: 178). In fact, the means
used by the military to restore this order were highly undemocratic as curfews were imposed,
people were arrested, political activities were prohibited and major trade unions and associations
were closed (Jenkins, 2007: 342). The impact of the coup became evident in the mid-1980s and
1990s with the rise of Islamic radicalism 15 that started to destabilize the notion of secularism in
Turkey (Demir and Bingöl, 2018: 178). Consequently, in 1997 almost all the state organs became
involved in countering the Islamic threat, which resulted in issuing 18 measures by the military to
the government; following by a report on the “spread of political Islam” that eventually increased
the reactions against the Islamists and leading to the formation of a new coalition that was accepted
by the military (Demir and Bingöl, 2018: 178). Many scholars defined the former actions as a
“post-modern coup”; indeed, this period revealed how citizens choose to defer to the military as a
better alternative, instead of insisting on a democratic process, and as Demirel puts it, “the unstated

14

50 Frequent changeover in leadership occurred as follows:• March 1971—January 1974 (elections in October
1973): A military/civilian regime• January 1974—November 1974: CHP (Republican People Party)/MSP (proIslamist National Salvation Party) coalition• November 1974—March 1975: A non-party caretaker government•
March 1975—June 1977: Right-wing coalition• July 1977—January 1978: A two-week coalition followed by a
second right-wing coalition• January 1978—October 1979: Ecevit led minority government• October 1979—
September 1980: Demirel led minority government (Demir and Bingöl, 2018: 178).
15

The Welfare Party, the largest party in 1995 elections, acted as the center of Islamic views forming a coalition
government with other Islamic parties like the Truth Path Party (Demir and Bingöl, 2018: 178).
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assumption was that the military would clear away the playing ground and then return to its
barracks without doing much damage to the status quo” (Demirel, 2005: 255).

To understand the period of military interventions until 2000, numerous scholars have
agreed that the Turkish civil-military relations could be explained through Huntington’s theory
that suggests when the military is more professionalized, it tends to become more autonomous and
not intervene in civilian politics. However, the professionalized military in Turkey tended to
intervene more and did not distance itself; indeed, “the increased professionalism of the army is
associated with greater influence in the Turkish case” (Demir and Bingöl, 2018: 179).
Furthermore, the interventions revealed how the military perceives itself closer to the state than
the government; in fact, the military and the civilian spheres were not separated (Demir and Bingöl,
2018: 179). Nevertheless, the military interventions have been described as a “moderator” type
because they were conducted to stop a political-economic turmoil or “re-secularize” a government
(Demir and Bingöl, 2018: 179). In fact, even though the Turkish military always returned the
power to the civilians and never preserved its rule permanently, it never installed a system that
ensures good governance, and thus it always used the “coup” as a last resort, which created a
system of civilian authority rather than supremacy (Jenkins, 2001: 34). In addition, Heper (2005)
states how the interventions failed to create lasting solutions, although they always had to
precipitate conditions like the inability of the civilian ruling governments to resolve major
problems either due to economic conditions, disagreements or other external factors (Heper, 2005:
215). On the other hand, William Hale (1994) argues that the Turkish military tends to return the
power to civilians after the interventions as a result of the gradual process of accepting the notion
of disengaging from the political system, not due to its adherence to democratic ideals and civilian
rule (Hale, 1994: 295). In sum, the overview of the military interventions till 2002 reveals how the
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military did not differ much from periods of civilian rule, in the sense that the military always
managed to ensure that every coup was supported by a segment of the political elite, business
owners and peasants (Demirel, 2005: 252). In fact, in the periods of military governments (19711973, 1980-1983), in terms of better protection of liberties and businesses, the people perceived
the military as a better alternative compared to “the so-called democratic regime” by the civilians
(Demirel, 2005: 254). Finally, it is important to note that all the aforementioned military
interventions have not only paved the way for a new party system 16 but also have set the stage for
a real shift in the Turkish civil-military relations which will be elaborated on more thoroughly in
chapter four.

The Role of the Turkish Military in Politics after 2002
Despite the military’s efforts in trying to sustain its tutelary and guardian role in Turkish
politics, a series of drastic developments started taking place since the AKP was elected to
government in 2002 (Keyman, 2012: 1). In fact, 2002 has indicated a real shift in the balance of
Turkish civil-military relations, as for the first time the elected civilian government is more
powerful than the military, and according to Haugom (2019), this unprecedented development has
occurred through three main stages (Haugom, 2019: 4). However, before discussing the changes
that resulted in this shift, it is crucial to layout first the reasons for diminishing the influence of the
military under the AKP (Bardakçi, 2013). According to Bardakçi (2013), four identifiable factors
changed the balance of power between the AKP and the military (Bardakçi, 2013: 414). The four
major factors are a de-securitization/ democratization process led by the European Union; a
powerful mandate given by the electorate to the AKP; a change in the balance of power between

16

The military attempted to ban most of the political parties and undermined the organizational strength of the
major political parties, which eventually resulted in a weak institutional party system (Bulut and Yildirm, 2020).
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the AKP and the Kemalist camp; and lastly, the uncovering of a series of coup plots and the
“Ergenekon and Sledgehammer’” legal processes (Bardakçi, 2013: 414; Haugom, 2019: 4). In fact,
the last factor acts more as a catalyst that triggered this transformation (Bardakçi, 2013: 414).
The constitutional and legislative reforms started with the launch of EU accession talks17
to allow Turkey to become a candidate after the Helsinki Summit in 1999 (Bardakçi, 2013: 412).
The talks suggested changes that brought changes that aimed to de-securitize and curb the
institutional role of the military; indeed, post these talks, the Turkish parliament passed the
“seventh harmonization package” which altered the composition and duties of the National
Security Council (MGK, Milli Güvenlik Konseyi) and limiting it to be an advisory body with a
majority of civilian members (Cagaptay, 2019: 77; Bardakçi, 2013: 412). Additionally, the
expenses of the military were put under the control of the Court of Accounts, which keep both the
defense and military expenditure accountable to the Parliament (Bardakçi, 2013: 413). The second
major development was the powerful mandate of November 2002, which brought an end to the
political fragmentation, allowing the AKP to strengthen its position and exercise full domestic and
external authority vis-a-vis the military (Bardakçi, 2013: 412). From the beginning, the AKP
distanced itself from previous Islamic governments and managed to build its character as a
moderate conservative democratic party (Bardakçi, 2013: 414). In addition, the AKP has pursued
a “strategy of confrontation-avoidance” in dealing with the military and established stronger
connections with liberal intellectuals (Bardakçi, 2013: 419). Eventually, the AKP government

17

The EU’s criteria for membership required Turkey to undertake a number of political reforms, including the
establishment of civilian supremacy and oversight of the armed forces, which was considered a crucial step for
Turkey to become a modern democratic secular state. In fact, the EU criteria became an important tool for
reducing the political influence of the military after Brussels imposed on Ankara to uphold “the rule of law”
(Cagaptay, 2019: 77; Haugom, 2019: 4).
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gained more domestic and international support, especially after it achieved several economic
successes and prevailed in a huge electoral battle 18 against the military (Bardakçi, 2013: 414). The
third factor is the expansion of “pro-AKP elements at the expense of the Kemalists” (Bardakçi,
2013: 415). As mentioned earlier, Kemalism had been the main ideological notion and “common
denominator that penetrated all schools of Turkish political thought,” and was expanded to the
whole society (Söyler, 2015: 106). However, with the rise of AKP, Turkey witnessed a rapid
ideological transition obtained from a wide spectrum of the conservative classes, the “Anatolian
bourgeoisie” and the electorate (Bardakçi, 2013: 414-415). Similarly, the realm of higher
education, a pillar of the Kemalist establishment and a significant influence in the 1997 coup has
undergone a major transformation process (Bardakçi, 2013: 414-415). Nevertheless, despite the
transformations aimed to change the role of the military in politics, the military remained a threat
to the civilian government. Indeed, in 2007, the diaries of a former Navy Commander revealed the
military’s conspiracy against the AKP in 2003-2004; the reasons behind this conspiracy were due
to the reforms of the AKP government to decrease the military’s independence and meet the
Copenhagen political criteria (Matos, 2013: 25). However, the AKP’s strength and the divisions
within the military led to the failure of the coup, along with the judicial investigations of
“Ergenekon and Sledgehammer”19 that have become a symbol of the AKP and Erdoğan’s victory
over the generals and opened the door for more influence to the civilian government (Haugom,
2019: 5). In sum, the civil-military relations under the AKP from 2002 till the failed coup attempt
18

On April 2007, the Constitution Court cancelled the election of the Parliament of Abdullah Gül (The AKP
candidate) on the ground that it did not meet the minimum number of deputies, and in the same day the General
Stuff warned the AKP government; nevertheless, the AKP did not submit to the pressure and won a sweeping
victory and elected Gül as president (Bardakçi, 2013: 414).
19 The Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases weakened the position of the Turkish Military; indeed, the many
charges that followed caused a crisis within the armed forces as many of the officers were prohibited from being
promoted and in facing the crisis, the Chief of Defense, and Commanders of land, sea and forces resigned.
Moreover, by 2012 over half of all Turkish admirals and one in 10 generals found themselves behind bars
(Haugom, 2019: 5).
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of July 2016, could be divided into two stages; the first one is the period (up until 2006) in which
there was a strong motivation by the government to join the EU membership, and the second stage
is a phase marked by the various institutional reforms that have curbed significantly the military’s
power.
“The Straw that Broke the Camel's Back”
The 15th of July 2016 coup attempt is perceived as “the straw that broke the camel’s back”;
following the various institutional, political, constitutional and ideological changes to end the
tutelary of the Turkish military, the coup was not only the last opportunity to regain the military’s
political power, but also it was the ultimate step Erdoğan needed to completely seize control over
the military. Before addressing the implications of this coup, I will first briefly give an idea about
the circumstances that made it happen. The causes of the coup are debatable, yet the main reason
was that the “perpetrators”/coup-plotters believed that it is their last chance to halt Erdoğan from
cleansing the military of Gülen loyalists (Yavuz and Koç, 2016: 141). This belief came to be after
the pro-government newspapers’ reports that were published and filled with news of possible
purges and retirements of Gülen-loyalist army officials; thus, “realizing that their time was running
out, the conspirators decided to carry out a kamikaze-style coup” (Yavuz and Koç, 2016: 141).
Furthermore, although the plotters were small in size, they managed to attract more generals and
hundreds of military officials who were aiming to preserve their careers and personal interests,
along with the increasing discontent of the policies 20 implemented by Erdoğan (Yavuz and Koç,
2016: 141).

20

All the policies will be discussed in detail in chapter four. Because they are discussed as part of the shift towards
the reverse to autocracy under Erdoğan.
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The Attempt
In the evening of July 15, 2016, some units from the Turkish military declared that they
seized control over the government, state institutions, and key communication media outlets
(Haugom, 2019: 1). Operating under the name “The Peace at Home Council” the coup plotters
declared on national television that the Turkish military had seized control; however, the main
target was capturing Erdoğan, who managed to leave the hotel in Marmaris just 15 minutes before
the forces arrived (Haugom, 2019: 1; Yavuz and Koç, 2016: 142). Indeed, just a few hours after
the declaration, it became clear that the Chief of Defense and other top commanders were against
the coup and it was evident that the coup was about to fail (Haugom, 2019: 1). Accordingly, Both
Erdoğan and Prime Minister Binali Yildirim denounced the coup and called the people to take the
streets and resist the coup attempt, which resulted in confrontations that led to the killing of 240
and people and several thousand were injured (Haugom, 2019: 1; Yavuz and Koç, 2016: 142). The
coup failed for multiple reasons: the first of them is a result of the refusal of the chief of staff of
the military and top commanders to sign on; in addition to the majority of the military who chose
to remain loyal to Erdoğan (Azeri, 2016: 466; Yavuz and Koç, 2016: 142). Moreover, the media
outlets and almost all of the political parties backed the civilian government, except the Kurdish
Nationalist Party (HDP). In fact, those who first responded to his calls are the religious
conservatives and Imams, addressing “believers” to defend Erdoğan and democracy (Yavuz and
Koç, 2016: 142). However, despite the failure of the coup, many Western observers are reluctant
to accept the premise that the Gülen were responsible for the coup; indeed, others claim that the
coup was staged by Erdoğan to use it as a justification to destroy his opposition and establish a
strong authoritarian rule (Yavuz and Koç, 2016: 143).

The Consequences of the Coup Attempt
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Following the defeat of the coup, Erdoğan launched a massive liquidation movement
within the army, various ministries, the academia and then instantly declared a state of emergency,
which suspended basic rights and freedoms (Azeri, 2016: 466). Accordingly, a rapid restructuring
of the Turkish military has taken place, which expelled hundreds of generals and admirals, and
imprisoned hundreds more; however, the main change was the transition from a parliamentary to
a strong presidential system in 2018 that resulted in giving the president absolute authority to
appoint the chief of defense, and give direct orders to the commanders of land, air and sea forces
without going ahead through and other authority (Haugom, 2019: 6). In addition, the Supreme
Military Council has also been suspended from many of its previous functions, leaving all the
major decisions like the assignments and promotions of generals to the president (Haugom, 2019:
6). Moreover, a new board of Security and Foreign Policy has been formed as a consultative body
to the presidency, which largely took over the guidance functions of the MGK. Erdoğan’s
administration also aimed at changing the educational system of the military as many military high
schools and academies were closed and fused into a new university under the Ministry of National
Defense (Haugom, 2019: 6). Currently, the Turkish Armed forces run the risk of becoming a “more
politicized and dysfunctional organization with a greater internal rivalry between branches and a
more restive officers’ corps”, indeed civil-military relations now seem to be highly based on the
personal relationship between the president and the minister of defense who has to prove his
loyalty to the former (Haugom, 2019: 7). Finally, without much participation from other state
bodies or the government, the failed coup not only marks the end of the Turkish military tutelage
but also demonstrates how the democracy in Turkey is far from being consolidated (Yavuz and
Koç, 2016: 147).
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Chapter III: The Democratic Project: Old versus New
Democratization studies have proven that the role of formal institutions is what
differentiates between autocracy and democracy; indeed, in defective democracies, the formal
institutions are usually downplayed by the function of informal ones and, thus, this mode of
domination is what creates the “deep state” (Söyler, 2015: 43). The concept of the deep state has
been often connected to the democratic experience in Turkey, and although the history of
democracy in Turkey goes back to 1923, since the establishment of the Modern Republic; it is
argued that the democratic project has never been fully developed and what has been only
implemented is a form of “electoral democracy” (Söyler, 2015; Somer, 2016: 4). According to
Murat Somer (2016), the old authoritarian regime of Turkey is still prevailing due to a particular
preset relationship between the state and society and an embedded state tradition that prevents the
establishment of accountable institutions and a balanced power-share (Somer, 2016: 4). Indeed,
the core of old authoritarianism is reflected in the numerous institutions that serve this top-down
power structure; the most leading example of these institutions has been the armed forces, as
illustrated earlier in chapter two (Somer, 2016: 4). However, other current ones play crucial roles
in reproducing this old authoritarianism like “The Council of Higher Education, the Presidency of
Religious Affairs, the Judiciary…furthermore, the ruling elites who control these institutions,
unwilling or unable to seek consensus with rival elites in opposition” (Somer, 2016: 4). To
conceptualize the former argument, Somer refers to the “influence of history” to describe the
foundational changes in institutions that have impacted democratization in Turkey (Somer, 2016:
4). Accordingly, for the purpose of evaluating H2: The autocratic policies by Erdoğan are
influenced by the historical experience of Turkey, the chapter examines the role of the historical
experience in Turkey through tracing the different phases of the democratic project with a greater
focus on the impact of institutions and political parties.
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The Deep State
The deep state is described as a type of “dual modality of domination” that results from the
“interplay between formal and informal institutions in post-transitional settings,”21 (Söyler, 2015:
43). This interaction between formal and informal institutions 22 usually fosters undemocratic and
informal rules that either weaken or completely dismantle the function of constitutional institutions
and inscribed formal rules (Söyler, 2015: 44). Söyler adds that this “perverse institutionalization” 23
is just negative because it creates “games”; for instance, when protestors aim for change, those in
the government, members of the parliament and military men know that there are other means to
prevent this change (Söyler, 2015: 44). In fact, the undemocratic informal rules are often upgraded
to the state’s “formal” codes to secure the interests of the elites of preceding authoritarian regimes
and, thus, prevent the transitions to democracy. Nevertheless, the absence of “perverse
institutionalization” does not also guarantee a consolidated democracy; therefore, it is important
to examine the formal rules in constitutional institutions with respect to the presence of the
undemocratic informal ones (Söyler, 2015: 44). In addition, the deep state is often supported by
an “autocratic clique”24 that is often part of the political establishment or the state’s coercive
apparatus like the leader of the “security community” (Söyler, 2013: 312). The security community

21

Formal institutions are created “through channels that are widely accepted as official”, while the informal
institutions do not (Söyler, 2013: 311).
22

Informal institutions are established under “forms of specific relationship (clientelism, or more precisely
autocratic cliques, clientelist parties, and mafia), using “material exchange (corruption) or violent exertion of
influence (putsch threat, guerrilla warfare, riots, and organized crime), or legal practice (custom law)” (Söyler,
2013: 312).
23

Perverse institutionalization: occurs when the institutions (formal and informal) are incompatible with the
workings of democracy (Valenzuela, 1990: 8).
24

Autocratic cliques: are considered semi-formal institutions due to their unofficial recognition; nevertheless, they
are granted the impunity to officially operate (Söyler, 2013: 312).
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is described as, “those elements of the regime most directly involved in the planning and execution
of repression, intelligence gathering, interrogation, torture, and internal clandestine armed
operations, [in which] can either be steered by the military institution or operate autonomously”
(Söyler, 2013: 312).

The Phases of the Turkish Deep State
Since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, the only element that was consistently
emphasized is secularism; indeed, to avoid the return of all types of religious practices and symbols
in the political and public sphere, strict policies were implemented (Hale, 1994: 80). Without a
doubt, secularism is a crucial element of a consolidated democracy, yet Turkey was a different
case because the secularist military and civil bureaucracy opted to dominate almost all institutions
(Hale, 1994: 81). In fact, this hegemony over the state’s formal and informal institutions was just
another form of sustaining an authoritarian power that eventually led to the growth of the deep
state. The first establishment of the Turkish deep state was organized in the 1950s by the US and
British Secret Intelligence Service to counter the “communist threat” (Karakoç, 2015: 44). The
operation in Turkey was found under the code name “Turkish Gladio” and its official name was
the Special Warfare Department (Özel Harp Dairesi, ÖHD), which was linked to the General Staff
(Karakoç, 2015: 44-45). Nevertheless, over time the initial purpose of the organization changed
and it was given the duty to protect the secular ideology of the state by any means including killing
politicians, subverting governments, as well as supporting underground groups like the “White
Forces” (Karakoç, 2015: 44-45). Moreover, the Turkish deep state has been always strongly
associated with the military, especially the industrial complex that acts as a mode of capital
accumulation to deliver political and economic resources to the military; indeed, the military-
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industrial complex has been either ruled by a strong executive branch or by military men who
guise as industrialists or investors (Söyler, 2013: 311).

It is argued that the deep state has been present throughout the different political changes
Turkey experienced. Nevertheless, with the invocation of Kemalism, the Turkish Armed Forces
maintained suspending democracy through conducting the two coups of 1960 and 1980, and the
two military interventions in 1971 and 1997 (Söyler, 2013: 315). The “threats” (communism,
Kurdish separatism, and Islamism) changed throughout the decades, yet Kemalism/secularism
remained the ultimate political “meta-language”, which led to a serious distorted electoral system
and “perverse institutions” (Söyler, 2013: 315). For instance, during the one-party era between
1925-1945, the expression of nationalism and secularism was further radicalized, then continued
in the 1960s with the rightist and leftist political movements that entered into a violent conflict in
the 1970s (Kaya, 2009: 102). Furthermore, in the 1980s, with the rise of the Kurdish question, a
new ground for the secretive operations by the deep state existed to contain the instability
happening in the southeast region of the state (Kaya, 2009: 102). Among those secretive operations
are those conducted by the Gendarmerie Intelligence and Counter-terror Unit (Jandarma İstihbarat
ve Terörle Mücadele, JİTEM) that has been allegedly responsible for thousands of executions and
assassinations of judges and PKK supporters (Kaya, 2009: 102). Despite the West’s increasing
interaction with the government to trigger democratization, the combination of events like the
Susurluk scandal and others that occurred a decade later, drastically shifted the prevalent paradigm
(Kaya, 2009: 103). In fact, such events created a profound societal awareness to question authority,
and people started examining the new meanings of state-society relations in a manner that provided
a better and convenient ground for democratization (Kaya, 2009: 103) The latter developments
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coincided with the Helsinki European Council in 1999 when the European Union (EU) referred to
Turkey as a candidate, which consequently invigorated its accession process (Kaya, 2009: 103).

The decline of the Turkish deep state started gradually in the 2000s with the introduction
of new “(in)formalities” (Söyler, 2013: 318). Indeed, the period of the post-Cold War era witnessed
changes in the distribution of power; for instance, the AKP came to fill a political void that was
created in 1997 by pledging to be a pro-western conservative political party that encourages new
democratization reforms to curb the military’s tutelage and simplify the process of joining the EU
(Söyler, 2013: 318). Despite the achievement of such reforms to reverse “perverse
institutionalization”, the military still had this “survival instinct” to maintain its “vanguard role”,
particularly since the vast majority of the public supported the EU project (Söyler, 2013: 318).
Yet, the military faced other prevalent issues like the disenchantment of the United State for
Turkey’s refusal to join the invasion of Iraq, along with the conspicuous support towards the AKP
as a “democratic model” in the Middle East (Söyler, 2013: 318). In fact, the circumstances
occurring at this period made it easier for the AKP to wane the tutelary of the military and the
prevailing deep state; in 2005 the AKP opted to ride the tide of “xenophobic anti-politics” that
prioritized the threat of a coup over democratization (Söyler, 2013: 319). The later phase ended
after the General Staff’s website released an e-memorandum charging the AKP of having a covert
Islamic agenda, yet the victory of the AKP in 2007 early presidential elections proved to be a
“democratic reflex” that forced the military to step back from its “putsch politics” because
conducting a coup would have left Turkey isolated and sabotaged its accession to the EU (Söyler,
2013: 319). The following historical episode that appeared to be the final battle between the AKP
and the deep state is the Ergenekon court case in 2008 (Gingeras, 2017:9). Indeed, for the first
time, the military generals were brought to justice for alleged coups; according to the indictments,
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the Ergenekon “group/gang” are responsible for four coup attempts between 2003-2004 (Söyler,
2013: 319). The Ergenekon group has been perceived as the core representative of the deep state;
its organs spanned the military, bureaucracy, academia, and solely conducted immense crimes over
decades to suppress the emergence of “true democracy” (Gingeras, 2017:9). Later, in 2010 the
“Operation Sledgehammer” (initially drafted in 2003) and “the Action Plan to Fight Reactionism”,
which merged with the anti-government propaganda in 2011, were conducted (Söyler, 2013: 319).
Finally, the constitutional amendments of the 2010 referendum had a real impact on changing the
“deeply engraved informal rules” in the Supreme Military Council, which was responsible for
making the decisions on promotion, dismissals, benefits, retirement and disciplinary measure
(Söyler, 2013: 319).

The Authoritarian Legacy
Conducting regular elections is not the only element that determines having democracy;
indeed, democracy at the most basic level is grounded on the diffusion of power within government
and society (Haass, 2003: 139). Moreover, it is crucial to have a balance of power among
institutions to prevent the accumulation of power by one branch, concerning the presence of
opposition and government leaders who are conscious that they are only serving temporarily
(Haass, 2003: 139). In a democratic regime, civil societies, trade unions and the media should be
independent of state control; in addition, all ethnic, social, religious and gender groups should
equally have the right to participate and be included in the political life (Haass, 2003: 140). In this
context and based on the former perspective, this part of the chapter aims to analyze the democratic
project in Turkey during the respective ruling periods of the Democrat Party (DP, 1950-1960), the
Motherland Party (ANAP, 1983-1991), and the Justice and Development Party (2002-present),
which are perceived as the “most stable periods in which Turkey had the opportunity to achieve
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democratic consolidation” (Karakoç, 2015: 38). However, for the purpose of the thesis, I will be
giving a greater focus on the ruling period of the AKP.

The Democratic Party (DP) rise to power led to major changes in the political system;
indeed, during its rule, the military encountered many political developments and policies
(Karakoç, 2015: 45). However, later during its second term, the DP government began exhibiting
authoritarian tendencies towards any opposition, not only against rival parties but also within the
government and the DP itself (Karakoç, 2015: 45). Accordingly, the military felt threatened and
its political prestige and ideological influence on the society kept declining; in fact, the military
perceived the DP government as an “enemy” that broke the convention, which assured the
inclusion of the military institutions in different branches of state institutions (Karakoç, 2015: 45).
According to many scholars, the DP failed to consolidate democracy in the country, and instead
exploited the strong public support it had, and implemented authoritarian policies that only caused
more distrust and polarization among the society (Karakoç, 2015: 46). The DP failed to transform
the prevailing system, and overlooked the actions of the deep state; indeed, this period witnessed
brutal nationalistic attacks against minority groups (Greeks, Armenians, and Jews) particularly in
September 1955 (Kuyucu, 2005: 362). The failure of the DP to deal with such turmoil, created a
struggle for power, especially against the secularists like the Republican People’s Party (CHP),
and eventually led the military to remove the government from power (Karakoç, 2015: 46).
Consequently, the undemocratic policies and the failure to disrespect opposition and minority
groups paved the way for the military to establish the coup of 1960 to use its right as a “guardian
of the state” and preserve its secular ideology (Karakoç, 2015: 46).
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Following a period of substantial privileges and power for the military, The Motherland
Party (ANAP) came to power. During the period between 1980-1983, the National Security
Council (MGK) that included the Chief of the General Staff, commanders, and ministers, was
charged with providing “recommendations” that were in de facto decrees (Narlı, 2011: 218).
Moreover, the MGK had exclusive power to interfere and define the national security priorities
and threats through formulating a “National Security Policy” document that is amended every five
years (Narlı, 2011: 218). Though in 1984, after the attacks of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK),
things got worse and the mission of the military was clearly directed to protect the state against
“Kurdish separatism” and “fundamentalism” (Sarigil, 2009: 712). However, the period of the
ANAP was more characterized by its leader Turgut Özal who challenged the state traditional policy
set by the military; for instance, he continuously aimed to strengthen the civilian control of the
government and reduce the military’s position by returning the banned leaders to the political arena
and replacing the appointed military liaisons in ministries with civilians (Karakoç, 2015: 47).
Despite the efforts of Özal, the military still had a strong position and reinforced it through using
the normative justification of “military struggle against terrorism”, and “the war against the PKK”
(Karakoç, 2015: 47). Nevertheless, it is important to note that Özal, as a conservative leader, did
not want to oppose the military; instead, he aimed to bring the military under civilian control and
transform Turkey into a regional power by allocating his resources to modernize the army and
build a strong economy (Narlı, 2011: 220). Özal chose to strengthen the civil society and the
business elites; and even though the military, relatively remained in the background, compared to
the period of the DP, he could not affect the deep state that remained active throughout his time in
office and maintained to consistently bring back the military hegemony (Narlı, 2011: 220).
Unfortunately, willingly or unwillingly, Özal fell into the pit of the deep state, and in 1987 the east
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and southeast provinces in Turkey became the headquarters of one of the prominent deep state
groups: The JİTEM (Kaya, 2009: 102).

The struggle between the military and Islamists/conservatives has been going on since the
AKP government came to power in 2002 (Karakoç, 2015: 48). The struggle stems from the
military’s position to protect secularism; in contrast, the AKP continues to promote itself as a
“conservative democratic” political party that struggles to establish “European Union standards”
democracy (Karakoç, 2015: 48). In this context, the military and its supporters continue to accuse
the AKP of having a secret Islamic agenda that eventually aims to transform the state into an
Islamic one (Karakoç, 2015: 48). Consequently, the AKP's focal mission was to complete Özal’s
legacy and implement the needed reforms to limit the military’s political influence over the civilian
government. To defend its existence, the AKP began with fully devoting its efforts to joining the
EU, because at the time such a step was crucial in restraining the political power of the military
(Karakoç, 2015: 48). In 2003, the MGK’s operational authorities were dismissed under a
constitutional amendment to meet the EU membership guidelines; accordingly, such reforms
prompted severe reactions from the military and the secular opposition groups who persisted to
allege the AKP of using the “EU negotiations” as a pretext to implement its fundamentalist policies
(Karakoç, 2015: 49). In fact, these reforms and efforts to eliminate the military’s power resulted
in putting the old elite against the ruling new one; however, the former could not prevent the latter
from increasing its influence in state institutions (Karakoç, 2015: 50). Nevertheless, the opposing
secularists maintained to express their disapproval of the “Islamization” of state institutions under
the government of the AKP through “Republic Protests” (Karakoç, 2015: 50). In addition, before
the beginning of the presidential elections in 2007, demonstrations were held carrying the slogans
“claim your republic!” and mottos such as “our territory is sacred” and “Turkish youth will not
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permit anyone to sell it” (Karakoç, 2015: 50). In this context, the AKP was perceived as an agent
of the “separatists” Western powers who aim to divide Turkey due to their insistence on supporting
Kurdish rights (Karakoç, 2015: 50). However, the battle between the military and opposing
secularists against the AKP government was arbitrated by the Ergenekon case in June 2008, which
has been discerned as a counterattack against the civil and military bureaucracy; eventually, the
military lost a great share of its authority and the AKP government started consolidating its power
instead of consolidating democracy.

The Impact of the Authoritarian Legacy
As reflected in the previous paragraphs, Turkey’s democratic experience has never been
fully consolidated and was characterized by many authoritarian tendencies. Indeed, Baykan (2018)
argues how the authoritarian legacy of Turkey has played a role in shaping the process of
democratic backsliding because it did not only destroy opposition parties (specifically the leftwing parties) but also drove the influential actors who represent the Islamic identity to construct
“a powerful mass membership organization” (Baykan, 2018: 237). Indeed, one of the major
circumstances that shaped this legacy is the military’s use of “selective pluralism” 25 strategy to
avoid the fragmentation and radicalization of political space (Baykan, 2018: 57). Nevertheless,
this restrictive and coercive strategy was not fully realized and led to unintended consequences,
including the destruction of the leftist organizational networks, and a gradual Islamization of the
society (Baykan, 2018: 59). Specifically, at the beginning of the 1990s, with the reemergence of
the center-right and center-left in the political arena, the Motherland Party lost momentum and that
resulted in a period of political stability and weak coalitions in the government (Baykan, 2018:

25

A strategy used by the military junta that was restrictive and coercive to inhibit “the fragmentation and
radicalization of the political space” (Baykan, 2018: 59).
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59). In addition, social and economic problems accompanied those political developments and led
to a clear decline in the political system, which also played a role in giving rise to Islamism in
Turkey and at the end triggered the intervention of the secular elite to prevent this rise (reflected
in the “soft coup” of 28 February 1997) (Baykan, 2018: 57). Accordingly, the Islamic elite
developed a reformist agenda and the AKP was found. In other words, the selective pluralism
strategy played in the favor of the Islamists and led to the AKP's huge electoral victory of 2002
and later created strong organizational leverage for electoral success and political resilience
(Baykan, 2018: 60).
The AKP “Democratic Model”
The AKP successful and exceptional “normalization”26 as a political party with an Islamic
background has attracted the interest of many observers in the academia due to its success in
maintaining votes steadily in general elections for the past eighteen years, irrespective of the
negative incumbency effect and its position in power (Baykan, 2018: 9; Öniş, 2015: 23). Thus, the
AKP has been gradually labeled the “hegemonic party” to describe its unprecedented dominance
in the Turkish political system (Öniş, 2015: 23). In retrospect, scholars divided the AKP rule into
three distinct periods; the first phase extends from 2002-2007, following by the second one from
2007-2011, and lastly from 2011 till present (which, arguably, could also be divided into subperiods because it includes different major events that led to major repercussions) (Tansel, 2018;
Öniş, 2015). The AKP was broadly positioned as a “force of democratization and a harbinger of a
new type of politics” which gave the chance to civil society actors to ultimately take precedence
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Normalization is described as a “process by which Islamist parties increasingly accommodate themselves to the
rules of the political regimes in which they operate; in other words, they become less unique and more normal
political actors when compared with other parties in the competitive system”; indeed, this terms draws less
normative implications than other terms like “liberalization” and “moderation”, yet it does not tell how the
“normalizing” political actors transforms to the “normal” (Baykan, 2018: 5).
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over the ossified state elites (Tansel, 2018: 204). In its first phase, which is also referred to as the
“golden age”, the AKP used and emphasized the democratic discourse with a clear intent on
reviving the economy, highly and inclusively, and joining the EU through reinforcing
liberalization and democratic reforms (Tansel, 2018: 198). In addition, the AKP promised a radical
reordering of the civil-military relation, and a recognition of the minority language and cultural
rights (Öniş, 2015: 23). The phase also witnessed successful foreign policy decisions dependent
on soft power and a “zero problem with neighbors” plan; thus, Turkey at the time was perceived
as a crucial mediator in regional and global conflicts (Öniş, 2015: 23). Indeed, throughout its first
two terms, the electorally successful “post-Islamist” party was recognized by its battles with
tutelary state apparatuses such as the military and the secular elites who wanted to preserve their
stance; in addition, it was praised for its role in bridging between Islam and democracy and
launching “democratic openings” (Tansel, 2018: 206). Öniş and Keyman (2003) used three words
“competence, integrity, and democracy” to describe the AKP’s keys to electoral success, declaring
“Turkey has finally elected a single-party government that strongly believes in economic reform,
basically respects the IMF framework, and wants full-fledged EU membership” (Öniş and
Keyman, 2003: 99-105). On the domestic level presented a historic opportunity for the country to
exit from the authoritarian regime post the military coup 1980, and on the international level, the
party was “a peace broker in multiple cultural, religious and political arenas” (Tansel, 2018: 206).
The second phase represented a relative period of stagnation particularly economically,
even though it managed to overcome the financial global crisis at the time. In addition, in the
political sphere, the democratic performance was mixed with elements of progress and decay
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associated with a dramatic decline in Turkey’s prospects for EU accession 27, which already
reflected the flounder of democratization-economic development and the beginning of the third
phase (Öniş, 2015: 24; Gürsoy, 2012: 760). The third phase has proven to be a period of decline
in the performance of the AKP, both politically and economically. As argued by Alpan (2016) and
Tansel (2018), the reliance on “coercion” rather than “consent” to shape policies, and enforcing
highly politicized court cases in 2010 against the alleged coup plotters represented the breaking
point for AKP’s “authoritarian turn” (Alpan, 2016: 17; Tansel, 2018: 205). On the other hand,
other observers believe that the real turning point is the government’s response to the Gezi’s
protests in 2013, which gravely undermined the AKP’s credibility and self-representation as a
“vehicle of civilianization, democratization, freedom of belief and equality of opportunity”
(Tansel, 2018: 205). The latter narrative shift corresponded to AKP’s own restructuring as the
party replaced its own claim of Turkey being a “conservative democracy” with obscure “advanced
democracy” (Alpan, 2016: 18). The striking fact, in this context, is the continuation of the AKP’s
electoral success despite the countless allegations concerning the party’s poor performance in key
policy areas. Thus, it is interesting to examine the prospects for democracy in Turkey regarding
the prolonged political and economic challenges under the AKP dominance. The growing evidence
of the democratic backsliding under this phase is indisputable, as many terms have been frequently
used to describe the authoritarian reversal like “illiberal democracy”, “hybrid democracy” or
“competitive authoritarianism” (Öniş, 2015: 25). Indeed, Turkey’s growing democratic shortfalls
are apparent in different yet interrelated spheres; beginning with a steady decline in freedoms like
the freedom of media and expression, jailing political activists and opposition, growing use of
excessive physical force, and overall monopolizing almost all state institutions (Öniş, 2015;
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In 2006, the EU suspended eight chapters of the “aquis” that would lead Turkey to become a member (Gürsoy,
2012: 760)
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Baykan, 2018; Tansel, 2018). In addition, the judicial system has been heavily politicized and
corrupted, as many court cases have proved to be void and biased. The corruption levels 28 have
tremendously increased, and accordingly, those who benefited are the new elites and individuals
affiliated to the higher ranks of party apparatus (Öniş, 2015: 25).

On the Deep State: Undemocratic Civilian Supremacy
The constitutional and legislative reforms in the 2000s 29undeniably led to the decline of
military autonomy; however, tracing the circumstances reflects the societal polarization that made
these reforms unavoidable (Söyler, 2015: 178). Indeed, Turkey endorsed a rapid transition that to
a great extent restored another form of a deep state characterized by a feeling of insecurity and
undemocratic control of the military (Söyler, 2015: 178). Nevertheless, specifically after 2005, the
AKP related the deep state to the “gangs of the nationalist struggle” (referring to the military and
its supporters) (Söyler, 2015: 205). Moreover, with the closure of the Ergenekon case in 2008, the
AKP decreased the leverage of the putsch threat (Söyler, 2015: 206). On the other hand, the
reforms reflected the division and distrust circle between those who regard the deep state as a real
danger and those who regard the deep state as a justification used by the AKP to punish its
opponents (Söyler, 2015: 207). Later the amendments of 2010 revealed the establishment of a
religious-conservative alliance between the Gülen Movement and the AKP that aimed to end the
leverage of the military in Turkish politics through exerting illegal instruments to influence state
apparatuses, such as the police and the judiciary (Baykan, 2018: 239). The result was a
reproduction of an authoritarian logic, and growth of a state within a state (Baykan, 2018: 239;
Söyler, 2015: 207). Despite the elimination of the Gülen movement as a political actor after the
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All the empirical data are later presented in chapter four.
Discussed earlier in chapter 2.
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failed coup of July 2016, the deep state continues to be restored as the state-banditry, and the
undemocratic control of “state security” remain unchallenged, and the reproduction of nationalist
discourses and the threat of “internal enemies” still exists.

The literature on the democratic journey of the AKP has been marked by analyses that
reflect the party’s fragmentary developments; in addition, the plethora of concepts used to describe
the late AKP period could be considered new theoretical explanations. However, the exact nature
of the Turkish regime is difficult to comprehend since it is fluid and evolving fast. Indeed, the
research by Cemel Tansel (2018) on Turkey’s Authoritarian neoliberalism and democratic
backsliding suggests that tracing the country’s political and institutional developments yield
different results, and only sub-categories of authoritarianism will be labeled according to the
different “events” chosen to be the “point of departure” towards authoritarianism (Tansel, 2018:
207). For instance, if taken before or after the AKP’s victory in general elections in 2011, the Gezi
Park protests of 2013, the struggle between the Gülenists and the AKP in late 2013, the 2014
presidential elections, the twin elections of 2015, the failed coup attempt of 2016, and lastly the
presidential referendum in 2017, it will be nearly impossible to determine the exact “label” of what
is happening in Turkey (Tansel, 2018: 209). Accordingly, underscoring the “phases” of
“backsliding” or “authoritarian turn” does not provide a precise explanation of what went wrong;
indeed, it just obscures the lineage of the AKP’s tendencies and policies towards its authoritarian
governance. In addition, overemphasizing certain political moments over the other prevents us
from considering the AKP’s authoritarian turn as a whole single authoritarian model, which has
already been shaped by executive centralization of power and sustained by the deployment of
state’s institutions in the service of the party’s interests (Tansel, 2018: 209-210). Such interests
have eventually transformed the state’s regulatory roles, yet normalized and legitimized
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authoritarian practices (Tansel, 2018: 210). Nevertheless, what is puzzling and remains
problematic is the continuation of the AKP’s electoral success despite its overt acts of
authoritarianism and exploitation of power. In addition, it is interesting to study the instruments
and strategic choices used by the party and Erdoğan to maintain their popularity.
Conclusion
The democratic project in Turkey has been dependent on “pact building, explicit formal
and informal rules” that are comparatively weak (Somer, 2016: 5). The latter, arguably, could be
considered a feature of old authoritarianism since it replicates the tendency of old elites to dismiss
the existence and legitimacy of other social and political segments. In addition, the consensus
among political actors has been absent or very short-lived due to the major transformations and
constant institutional makeovers that have been occurring since the establishment of the modern
republic. In fact, as mentioned earlier, most of these changes/decisions are based on the preferences
and interests of hegemonic actors, excluding others even though such decisions are meant to be
democratic, inclusive and formal (Somer, 2016: 5). However, it is important to note that both
constitutions of 1961 (mainly liberal and democratic) and 1982 (more anti-liberal and nationalist)
were prepared by bodies chosen by the military; thus, some segments of the society who were
affiliated to the ideological convictions of the junta enjoyed more privileges than those who did
not (Somer, 2016: 5) Furthermore, in both periods the military exercised its veto powers and
institutionalized its influence in politics; accordingly, the elected government, post the 1987
elections, could not enjoy a fully-fledged autonomy and the military remained intervening
explicitly and implicitly (Somer, 2016: 5). Another fundamental flaw that has been present in the
Turkish democratic project is the inability of the governments to integrate ethnic groups’
representatives (mainly Kurdish and Islamists) in the political system; thus, the democratic
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transition is incomplete, demographically and institutionally, and does not apply to a major
segment of the population (Kurdish region) (Somer, 2016: 6). Last but not least, the chapter
indicates how the democratic project in Turkey has never been fully consolidated as it emphasizes
the importance and popularity of “electoralism” in Turkish politics. In addition, it presents the
impact of authoritarian legacy and underscores the challenges of the deep state, and the
authoritarian tendencies that have always existed and continue to be present in the Turkish political
system.
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Chapter IV: Reversing or Surviving?
Building on the arguments presented in the previous chapters, what remains puzzling is the
continuation of the AKP’s electoral success despite its overt acts of authoritarianism and
exploitation of power. Indeed, even with the existence of rich literature on the Turkish case
presenting the authoritarian practices under the present government, most of the structural
explanations fail to account for its regime trajectory. Thus, for the purpose of evaluating H3: The
personalization of institutions is a key cause of democratic backsliding in Turkey, this chapter aims
to examine the authoritarian reversal and strategies used by Erdoğan and the AKP to entrench their
power, through using evidence excerpted from newspaper articles, expert analyses, statements by
Erdoğan, and independent agency reports. The arguments will highlight the role of agency since
the former arguments were structural-based.
Personalism, Populism and the “Erdoğanization of Turkish Politics” 30
What explains the move to autocracy under Erdoğan and the AKP? Is it a means of survival
or reform? Why in general is Turkey backsliding despite the marginalization of a key institution,
the military, since the mid-2000s? As presented in the previous chapters, most of the literature on
authoritarian backsliding and resilience provides several structural explanations like state capacity
opposition strength, economic performance and historical legacies; however, such factors fail to
provide a comprehensive answer to the aforementioned questions. Thus, looking at the agencybased explanations will help in examining adequately the solidification of Erdoğan’s rule over the
past two decades. To begin with, it is argued that politics have become more personalized both in
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Adopted from Selçuk et al (2019) research paper “The Erdoğanization of Turkish Politics and the Role of the
Opposition”.
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advanced democracies and developing nations; accordingly, the role of the individual has become
more prominent at the expense of other institutional actors like parliaments and political parties.
Personalization is defined as “a process in which the political weight of the individual actor in the
political process increases over time, while the centrality of the political group (i.e., political party)
declines” (Rahat and Sheafer, 2007: 65). Similarly, personalism is defined as the “loyalty to
persons rather than to impersonal ideologies, institutions, or rules”31 (Ansell and Fish, 1999: 286).
On the other hand, populism is another concept that is understood in this context as a strategy and
a means that has played a role in maintaining power and building the personalization process under
Erdoğan (Narin, 2019: 120). Due to the emphasis of individuals over institutions, the
personalization of the regime is referred to as “the notion in which the individual political actors
have become more prominent at the expense of parties and collective identities” (Karvonen, 2010:
4). Consequently, power is concentrated more at the executive branch, which results in weakening
other state institutions (Selçuk et al, 2019: 544). Personalism can be “charismatic”, “strategic” or
both; firstly, charisma according to Weber (1974) is a term that has been initially used as an
adjective to describe a leadership performance and a component that is strongly affiliated with
moral authority and legitimacy (Weber, 1974: 46-47). Charismatic leaders often produce
ideological or intellectual narratives to their people, yet non-charismatic leaders have
“transactional roles” and use power with different segments of groups to derive their authority as
they attach greater importance to effectiveness and cohesion than to political principles (Ansell
and Fish, 1999: 288). According to Ansell and Fish, non-charismatic leaders greatly benefit from
publicly maneuvering in their programs and positions by using “robust action”, which is a tactic
to effectively reach diverse segments of the society through convincing each audience that he/she
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Personalization and personalism are two inter-related concepts that will be used inter-changeably to understand
how Erdoğan developed his autocratic rule.

62

represents their interests (Ansell and Fish, 199: 288-308). In line with this trend, various scholars
have referred to the increasing prominence of Erdoğan as “Erdoğanization” since he has managed
to strongly enforce his personalistic leadership at the expense of other key institutional actors: the
military, judiciary, parliament, and media sphere (Selçuk et al, 2019: 541). In fact, in relating
personalism to “Erdoğanization”, Erdoğan as a leader has managed to merge both “robust action”
and “populist -appeal” in his style of ruling to strengthen his rule and legitimize his undemocratic
actions. According to Baykan (2018), Erdoğan depends heavily on his organizational power,
pragmatism and dynamism that are components of “robust action” and essential for his strategic
inventiveness (Baykan, 2018: 130). “Robust action” is visible in many of his speeches (will be
later addressed), in his activities within the party, during his electoral campaigns, and most
importantly when encountered with unprecedented “threats” or circumstances (Baykan, 2018:
130). In fact, it is important to note the structural circumstance profoundly shape the strategic
choices of Erdoğan, in addition to his “pseudo-charisma” that relies on populism and organized
mass support (Baykan, 2018: 138).
The current debates on the Erdoğanization of Turkish politics particularly focus on
Erdoğan’s third term in government, arguably also thought as the beginning of the AKP’s shift
towards favoring Islamism over democratic ideals (Selçuk et al, 2019: 546). Özbudun (2014)
emphasizes how Erdoğan’s style of leadership, in his third term, manifests “clear marks of
personalism, with a strong sense of mission and an excessive concentration of authority in his
hands;” in addition, Erdoğan’s accountability is dependent on the ballot box (vertical
accountability), “as the only instrument of accountability and the only source of democratic
legitimacy” (Özbudun 2014, 163). Yet, instruments of horizontal accountability have been
significantly weakened, since according to Erdoğan and the AKP, the “national will” is sacredly
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expressed through the ballot box (Özbudun 2014, 163). Similarly, Öniş (2015) expresses the
growing signs of personalism in Erdoğan’s third term in government, especially post the political
developments in 2013 (Gezi protests), 2014 (local and presidential elections), and 2017
(presidential referendum) (Öniş, 2015: 22). Moreover, Lancaster (2014) traces the AKP’s internal
operations since its founding and argues that there has been a gradual deterioration of democracy
within the party that transformed to oligarchy then personalism (Lancaster, 2014: 1672). She points
out that democracy was the core primary method for carrying out the internal affairs of the party;
however, by 2007 the intra-party democracy backslid towards increased centralization of power
around Erdoğan (Lancaster, 2014: 1680). In complementing Lancaster’s argument, Taş (2015)
explains how the AKP is distinctly representing a one-man rule under Erdoğan, especially after he
gained full control over the party by 2008 and relegated his competitors (Taş, 2015: 782). Taş
asserts, “Erdogan also assured his ascendancy in both the party administration and in government
by hiring numerous advisors, some of whom are considered to be more powerful than ministers”
(Taş, 2015: 782). Some scholars categorize Erdoğan as populist and identify certain variables of
populism, which will be examined to demonstrate how populism plays a role in the Turkish
democratic backsliding. Populism is defined as “a political phenomenon in which an antiestablishment figure cultivates direct linkages with the people in an antagonistic way” (Selçuk,
2019: 57). Erdoğan uses certain criteria of populism; firstly, he depends on “historical references”
as 59% of his speeches included historical accounts to strengthen his arguments (Narin, 2019: 81).
For instance, he draws a comparison between historical Ottoman battles and the night the July 15
coup attempt, as there is always a political continuation within the Turkish nation, stating “The
ones who do not understand the secret of the conquest of Istanbul, cannot understand the actual
meaning that the Republic of Turkey expresses” (Narin, 2019: 82). In addition, he aligns himself
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with historical political figures like Selahaddin Eyyubi, Fatih, Sultan Selim and more (Narin, 2019:
82). Another criterion that is present in 68% of Erdoğan’s speeches is the “will of the people”
rhetoric to establish a communication between him and the nation; indeed, he always used this
rhetoric as a justification for campaigning in elections or when introducing new amendments in
the constitution (Narin, 2019: 83). The third populist element Erdoğan uses is the reference to “evil
minority” as 63% of his speeches always include “the other” or “the enemy” (Narin, 2019: 84).
The “evil minority” the Gülen movement and the PKK since they lack enough power to damage
the country, yet Erdoğan often manages to combine all the threats Turkey faces in a single plan;
for example, in one of his speeches, he stated, “Turkey, just like in other fields, is under siege
economically. The attacks started with the Gezi protests, went on with the 17-25 December coup
attempt, and promoted to a higher degree by the July 15 coup attempt, seem to be going on. We
need to be prepared the different types of such attacks that target the independence, the economic
interests, and the national pride of Turkey” (Narin, 2019: 86). In sum, for Erdoğan, the different
political incidents or “threats” are not seen a result of economic, social or political circumstances,
but they are a result of an inter-connected bigger plot that attacks him, the AKP and Turkey (Narin,
2019: 86). Another populist element often addressed by Erdoğan is the rhetoric of revolution and
liberation, which is utilized specifically before the elections; indeed, in his first speech after before
succeeding in changing the political system, Erdoğan used words like “building new Turkey and
renaissance” to encourage people to vote in the referendum and shift to the presidential system in
2018 (Narin, 2019: 87). Last but not least, Erdoğan strongly criticizes any opposition and justifies
non-democratic means against them; and to appeal this notion to the people, he is vocal about it in
many of his speeches (Narin, 2019: 120-124. Finally, apart from the elements of populism, another
aspect of personalism Erdoğan strongly carries is the concentration of power into his hands;
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accordingly, in the following section, the strategies of “reversal” will be addressed to help in
explaining the reality of personalizing state institutions.
Strategies of Reversal
Throughout the mid-2000s, by all accounts, most of the structural and external factors
necessary for deepening democracy existed; indeed, the economic growth was at its peak, the
middle class expanded, the ethnic conflicts were restrained, the cooperation between Turkey and
the West was subdued, and most importantly the Turkish military was relatively contained in its
barracks (Arbatli, 2014: 77; Öniş, 2015: 40; Esen and Gumuscu, 2016: 1604). Nevertheless, by
2013 the ruling elites shifted towards authoritarian practices, and “incumbents regularly violated
the political rights and civil liberties of opposition groups, abused state resources, and manipulated
electoral results” (Bayulgen et al., 2018: 335). Bayulgen et al. (2018) introduce three strategies
implemented by ruling elites: centralization, legitimation and repression32 (Bayulgen et al, 2018:
333). They analyze the dynamics of the three strategies, arguing that the interaction among those
strategies in hybrid regimes is a defensive/reactive mechanism instead of being a goal in itself
(Bayulgen et al, 2018: 336-337). Briefly, during the 2002-2013 period, Erdoğan and the AKP
elites’ survival strategy was first based on legitimation by committing to liberal economic and
political reforms, introducing populist social reforms, enhancing relationships with neighboring
countries, and reinforcing minority rights (Bayulgen et al, 2018: 338-340). However, by 2007 the
regime undertook the centralization strategy by systematically marginalizing the political role of
the military, restructuring the judicial branch through introducing the constitutional referendum of
2010, moving towards an executive-centered legislature, and weakening intra-party opposition to
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Repression is defined as the “actual or threat-ened use of physical sanctions against an individual or
organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well
as deterring specific activities” (Davenport, 2007: 2).
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minimize the challenges that could encounter the AKP’s legislative hegemony (Bayulgen et al,
2018, 338-340). In addition, this period witnessed targeted repression against the media and
opposition forces, especially towards the military elites (Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials),
left-wing activists, and Kurdish politicians (Bayulgen et al, 2018, 338-340). In sum, “the electoral
successes of the AKP in 2007 and 2011 were achieved by this balancing act between increased
centralization, transactional legitimation, and selective repression” (Bayulgen et al, 2018, 338).
On the other hand, as will be demonstrated in the following paragraphs, the period between 2013
to present witnesses a different and higher level of ideological legitimacy, extreme centralization,
and widespread repression.
Threats and Responses
“Twin crises”
In efforts to deal with the challenges and political crises, Erdoğan has successfully
managed to deal with each “threat” through using different responses that intensified repression
and consolidation of his powers. In fact, particularly since 2013, the regime has survived under a
new equilibrium using a mix of the aforementioned strategies (Bayulgen et al., 2018: 356). With
unprecedented increased repression to suppress any opposition, Erdoğan responded to the Gezi
Park protests of 2013 (Gurcan and Peker, 2015: 29). The Gezi Park protests began with a
movement called “Taksim Solidarity” that included different causes of 124 trade unions, political
parties, initiatives and community groups that called for a peaceful expression of demands and
rights (Jadaliyya, 2013). The protestors were acting under the constitutional right that should
guarantee for them the freedom of demonstration and expression under Article 34 of the Turkish
Constitution; however, Erdoğan warned the protestors to end their demonstration in the square,
stating, “if our brothers are still there, I am telling them in goodwill to please leave the area,
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because it belongs to all Istanbul and it is not to be occupied by illegal groups” (Phillips, 2017:
37). However, the protestors ignored the warning demanding their rights and Erdoğan responded
with, “we have made our decision, and we will do as we have decided” (Letch, 2013). The raid
on the protestors began, as more than twenty-five thousand police members surrounded Taksim
Square and used excessive force including tear gas bombs and water cannons to disperse the
protestors (Letch, 2013). The police brutality was unprecedented and the violence was spread all
over the country; commenting on this abuse of force, Koray Caliksan, a political scientist in
Istanbul University, “Erdoğan is a very confident and very authoritarian politician, and he doesn’t
listen to anyone anymore, but he needs to understand that Turkey is no kingdom and that he cannot
rule Istanbul from Ankara all by himself” (Letch, 2013). In fact, later the protests turned into a
conflict between Erdoğan’s supporters and the protestors, as Erdoğan threatened to bring his
supporters to the streets, warning, “if you use provocative words, our people will never forgive
you [and] if you gather 100,000 people, I can gather a million” (Letch, 2013). The use of excessive
force was condemned by international human rights organizations and EU officials like Stefan
Fuele, the EU Enlargement Commissioner, who disdained the brutal means used by Erdoğan and
emphasized that such means should have no place in a “democracy” (Phillips, 2017: 37). The Gezi
Park protests signify a turning point in Erdoğan’s approach in dealing with human rights and
freedoms and reflect his adoption of a repressive strategy. Similarly, in response to the corruption
probe of 2013, Erdoğan depleted the full force of the state’s coercive apparatus to remove
prosecutors and police officers linked to the Gülen Movement (Demiralp, 2016: 5). Nevertheless,
the crackdown on the Gülenists continued with the beginning of the elections in November 2015,
as the government officially declared the Gülen movement as a terrorist organization (Demiralp,
2016: 5). Furthermore, in 2014, Erdoğan aimed to expand the powers of the Turkish Intelligence
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Agency (MIT) by passing a bill that gives the agency a mandate to perform any action (like
accessing data and information of a public and private institution without parliamentary oversight)
in the name of preserving the national security (Bayulgen et al., 2018: 359). In addition to the
widespread repression, Erdoğan’s consolidation of power reached another level after the
presidential elections of 2014; he took multiple steps to avoid a future succession crisis. The steps
included appointing Ahmed Davutoglu, a longtime loyalist, as a prime minister, and ignoring the
symbolic constitutional status of the presidency office, and transforming it into an executive post
(Öniş, 2016: 151-152).
“Under Siege”
“Democracy is like a streetcar. You get off when you have reached your
destination”
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Phillips, 2017: 3)
Although it is hard to gauge Erdoğan’s intentions, some of his earlier statements on democracy
could be illuminating in understanding the logic behind using authoritarian measures. On the other
hand, it is argued that such measures are only means of defense against the military tutelage and
the defenders of the Kemalist regime (Bayulgen et al, 2018, 447). Accordingly, the first area of
centralization concerned the military establishment. As illustrated in chapter two, the Turkish
military had always been a veto player in the political system; therefore, the prominent goal for
Erdoğan in his first term was to eradicate the “threatening” political authority of this player through
abiding by the EU harmonization reforms (Bayulgen et al, 2018: 348). However, the first real
backlash against the military was in 2008 by using the judicial branch to contain its political
influence; for example, the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer coup trials that targeted military elites
and resulted in arresting more than 400 officers, including high-ranking generals and admirals
(Bayulgen et al, 2018: 348). In fact, by 2013 more than 10% of the military generals and admirals
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were imprisoned under charges of alleged attempts to overthrow the government (Bayulgen et al,
2018: 348). Whereas overhauling and decreasing the Turkish civil-military relations is a crucial
democratizing step, many opposed the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials and raised serious
concerns regarding fundamental human rights (Heper, 2011: 243-244). However, the real
commencement of hostility between Erdoğan and the military began with the alleged 15th of July
coup in 2016.
“The Turkish Armed Forces, in accordance with the constitution, have seized management
of the country to reinstate democracy, human rights, and freedom, and to ensure public order,
which has deteriorated”
15th July 2016 Coup plotters (Phillips, 2017: 165).
This statement reflected how Turkey at the time of the coup was deeply divided between two
camps: backers and opponents of the coup (Phillips, 2017: 168). Nevertheless, the majority of the
Turkish society was against the coup, as the coup plotters did not only lack support from the
opposition political parties, but also within the military itself (Phillips, 2017: 168). Indeed, the lack
of support from the opposition proved that military intervention is not the “path” to democracy
(Phillips, 2017: 168). However, after the coup, the blame game started immediately upon
Erdoğan’s arrival from Istanbul who accused Fethullah Gülen of being the coup “mastermind”
(Phillips, 2017: 169). Erdoğan later issued statements like: “This latest action is an action of
treason, and they will have to pay heavily for that,” he added, “this attempt, this move, is a great
favor from God for us. Why? Because this move will allow us to clean up the armed forces, which
needs to be completely clean” (Arango and Yeginsu, 2016). In addition, he promised to “purge all
state institutions of the virus spread by Gülen’s supporters” (Phillips, 2017: 169). The actual
crackdowns began with the declaration of a three-month state of emergency, subject to extending,
which allows the government to have exclusive and extraordinary powers; accordingly, by the end
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of 2016, Erdoğan dismissed more than 100,000 people state institutions (including the military,
judiciary and security forces) (Phillips, 2017: 171). Indeed, the coup was a “gift from God” as it
justified unprecedented centralization of power and repression (Bayulgen et al, 2018, 361).
Personalized Reforms

The reforms after July 15 have been characterized by being extensively personalized.
Indeed, under the state of emergency law and the fear of an active “parallel-state”, many executive
decrees have been wielded and many purges have been justified by the power of the presidency
(Gürcan and Giscoln, 2017: 68). According to Gürcan and Giscoln, the military’s reforms targeted
four main aspects: education, judicial system government relationship, and privileged domain
(Gürcan and Giscoln, 2017: 70). The reforms on the military education started with closing all the
military schools in Turkey, and instead, a new inclusive National Defense University was founded;
as a result, more than 16,500 military cadets were expelled from naval academies and military high
schools (Gürcan and Giscoln, 2017: 70). The reforms targeting the military judicial system
required disciplining military judges through the Ministry of Defense; in fact, the disciplinary
action became a major function under the Ministry of Defense’s authority. The latter resulted in
completely eradicating the military judicial system that was earlier and partially affected by the
EU-inspired reforms over the last decade (Gürcan and Giscoln, 2017: 72). Additionally, the
reforms ended the military’s privileged domains through implementing radical decisions to
dismantle the military’s medical network, industrial establishments, factories and more (Gürcan
and Giscoln, 2017: 71). Regarding the reforms targeting the military-government relationship, the
first clash was the postponement of the annual meeting of The Supreme Military Council (YAŞ)
that is made to foster the discussion of the promotions and retirements of military personnel, which
reflected a sign of “civilianization”. (Gürcan and Giscoln, 2017: 71). Additionally, the structure of
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the YAŞ changed, as more civilian representatives were appointed at the expense of dismissing a
number of military officers (Gürcan and Giscoln, 2017: 71). In short, all the aforementioned
reforms have been just steps towards depoliticizing and sidelining the military, yet they led to the
unprecedented rise of personal and autocratic concentration of power under the state’s executive
branch.
Another key implication of the coup is the transition from a parliamentary to a “super”
presidential system in 201733 (Bayulgen et al., 2018: 360; Haugom, 2019: 6). The transition came
with a new set of laws; for instance, the appointment of the Chief of Defense is directly chosen by
the president, the General Staff will be part of the Ministry of National Defense instead of attaching
it to the Prime Minister’s office. In addition, the president has the right to appoint and give direct
orders to the commanders of forces without having to pass through other authority (Haugom, 2019:
6). The Supreme Military Council had been discharged of its former units and functions, giving
all the major decisions concerning the armed forces to the president; furthermore, a new Board of
Security and Foreign Policy has replaced the “so powerful” MGK that played the role of the
“guardian” since the establishment of the Turkish Republic (Haugom, 2019: 7). To establish
control, Erdoğan sought to appoint those close and loyal to him; for example, his first move was
the appointment of General Hulusi Akar as the Minister of National Defense (former Chief of
Defense) who proved his loyalty to him and the civilian government during the 15 th of July coup
attempt (Jongerden, 2019: 266; Haugom, 2019: 7). Another loyalist is Adnan Tanriverdi 34 who is
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In the parliament, the AKP was able to acquire votes needed to send the constitutional amendment to a
referendum, which took place on April 16, 2017. Despite strong opposition, Erdoğan claimed a narrow victory of
51.4% in favor.
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He is also the founder of SADAT, a defense contractor that trained pro-Turkish fighters in Syria and was accused
by Erdogan’s opponents of training pro-AKP militias (Danforth, 2020: 6).
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a former general and served as a chief military advisor from 2016 till early 2020 (Danforth, 2020:
6). Disputably, the Turkish military is becoming a more politicized and dysfunctional organization
with internal rivalries. In fact, as argued by Gurcan (2018) “Civil-military relations now seem
largely based on the personal relationship between the president and the minister of defense,
without much participation from other government or state actors” (Gurcan, 2018: 11). This
observation, certainly, emphasizes how this change in civil-military relations provides a fertile
ground for political factionalism in the military (Haugom, 2019: 7). Moreover, under the AKP and
Erdoğan, new religious conservative elites emerged and worked on depriving the military of many
of its former advantages, especially economic ones (Ankur, 2013: 141). In addition, even though
Turkish society has always respected the role of the military in guaranteeing political stability and
secularism, the majority of the Turkish public prefers to place limitations and oppose its
intervention in politics (Sarigil, 2011: 275). In sum, the civil-military relations under Erdoğan
drastically changed; however, the real opportunity to completely de-militarize Turkish politics was
the attempted coup of July 2015 (Haugom, 2019: 7).

Reforms and Strikes
“Let’s make this period a time of reforms, prioritizing a new constitution. The Turkish
Republic has enjoyed its best period in the last thirteen years. Now, we shouldn’t be worried
about changing the nature of the regime”
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Toksabay and Aslan, 2015)
Erdoğan has systematically aimed to consolidate his power, and in pursuing this goal, he has
strongly depended on reforming institutions and organizations, controlling civil society, repressing
and dismissing public officials (particularly from the military personnel, judiciary, police, and state
officials from almost every state department), and changing the old legislation and introducing the
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new one (Yılmaz, 2020: 268). Yılmaz (2020) refers to this new form of legalization as “strategic
legalism”, which is defined as “the use, abuse and misuse of rule of law to achieve politically
legitimate aims, hence, reducing the rule of law to the existence of legal norms by strategically
manipulating/abusing legal powers, processes, and rules” (Yılmaz, 2020: 271). Strategic legalism
includes many components; for instance: power is expanded in decision-making processes, the
rule of law is reduced through the instrumentalization of other governmental strategies, the
executive inserts new “legal black and grey holes” to increase its dominance, and lastly, the
judiciary, in general, becomes politicized through directly transforming political questions into
legal ones (Yılmaz, 2020: 271). Eventually, the logic behind strategic legalism is to curb the
powers of other areas of state authority and serve the president’s supreme power (Yılmaz, 2020:
271), In line with this logic, Erdoğan, and the AKP have systematically deployed the law and court
as instruments to marginalize potential rivals, repress opposition and consolidate their political
power (Yılmaz, 2020: 272).

The first strike against the judiciary was the 2010 constitutional amendments, which aimed
to restructure the duties of the higher courts and Supreme Council of Public Prosecutors and Judges
(Bayulgen et al., 2018: 349). Supported by 58%, the AKP succeeded in imposing the amendments
that give the president and the parliament greater say over the appointments of senior officials
(Bayulgen et al., 2018: 349). In fact, weakening the judicial branch significantly provides the AKP
government unchecked powers and significant opportunities to implement policies that serve the
executive interests. Thus, the party organization functions as an instrument to implement the
legislative agenda of Erdoğan (Bayulgen et al., 2018: 350). However, the powers of the executive
were further entrenched when the AKP won the parliamentary elections of 2011, gaining 59% of
the seats. Accordingly, during the first six months, the AKP managed to pass 35 decrees, and
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Erdoğan offered a new constitutional debate to replace the parliamentary system with
presidentialism besides the proposition of drafting a new constitution (Taş, 2015: 782). Erdoğan’s
wills were, indeed, met with the 2017 constitutional amendment, which witnessed the rise of a new
presidential regime. In fact, the constitutional amendment of 2017 opened that way for an
extremely powerful presidency that now holds all the state’s institutions' powers and provides the
elected president with absolute powers (Yılmaz, 2020: 276). In short, the role of the president is
no longer symbolic, as it was under the parliamentary system because the president has become a
non-partisan and has the power over his/her party (Yılmaz, 2020: 276). The benefits and rights of
the president in a presidential system are plenty; for example, the president has the right to bypass
legislation, issue decrees concerned with executive power, appoint ministers and high-level state
administrators, determine the state’s annual budget, dissolve the parliament, choose half of the
Board of Judges and Prosecutors, and declare a state of emergency when “threatened” (Öztürk and
Gözaydın, 2017: 220). Nevertheless, such supreme powers are not subject to supervision or
criticism; consequently, the president is not only the executive head of the state but also a
representee of the state and party unification (Öztürk and Gözaydın, 2017: 220). In addition, as
mentioned before, Erdoğan used the politicization of the judiciary in attacking opposition and
potential rivals. Over time, an unprecedented number of political trials targeted military officials,
Kurdish politicians, Kemalist elites, Gülenists, socialists and more 35 (Bayulgen et al., 2018: 351).
In line with these measures, thousands of state employees were deprived of their passports, at least
228,137 persons were detained (from July 2016 to March 2018), more than 130,000 state
employees got expelled, and 1,427 associations were dissolved (Yılmaz, 2020: 268). In sum,
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According to the report released by the Turkish Ministry of Justice, between 2009 and 2012 alone, a total of
32,279 people was tried for being leaders or members of an “armed organization,” and 19,635 people were
convicted on these charges (Bayulgen et al., 2018: 351).
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Erdoğan and the AKP have managed to implement strategic legalism, and currently, the distinctive
line, between what is legal and what is not, is blurry (Yılmaz, 2020: 277).
“The Parallel State”
“All the dirty laundry will come out. Many people won’t sleep a wink tonight”
Kemal Kilicdaroglu, chairman of the Republican People’s Party (Pitel, 2016).
Although it is certainly autocratic to claim that one is the “sole guardian of the nation and the
people,” Erdoğan has managed to exploit his powers in his favor; in addition, his rule has been not
only characterized by repression and instability but also corruption (Yılmaz and Turner, 2019:
693). Indeed, some commentators on Turkish politics have argued that the corruption has never
been more evident, and that results from Erdoğan’s decisions of choosing his “personal loyalty”
to deepen his autocratic structure (Matusiak, 2015: 32). Even though Erdoğan blames the military
and Fethullah Gülen for inaugurating a “parallel state”, in reality, his expansion of personal
clientelist networks from the top government levels to the local ones is the main cause of creating
a corrupt parallel state (Matusiak, 2015: 32). As argued by Yılmaz and Turner (2019), “the AKP
revived the security state of the 1990s and organized a reactionary backlash composed of
resentment, extreme nationalism and state violence”, which consequently, shifted Turkey from a
“tutelary democracy” to an authoritarian competitive regime (Yılmaz and Turner, 2019: 694). In
2010, the government adopted an anti-corruption action plan, as part of the EU accession process;
the plan included a set of reforms to criminalize bribery, money laundering, extortion and all illegal
actions that provide greater benefit to a specific group of people (Phillips, 2017: 47). However,
practically, the anti-corruption authorities proved to be ineffective, because the rules were weakly
enforced, particularly after the AKP earned its third mandate in the elections of 2011 (Phillips,
2017: 47). Accordingly, officials increasingly became bold in their practices, and impunity
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fostered a room for corruption that touched top levels of government and Erdoğan’s family
(Phillips, 2017: 48). Corruption is a tool for Erdoğan to reward his family, loyalists, and also a
weapon to undermine his opponents and consolidate his power (Phillips, 2017: 52). In fact, his
concentration of power is a form of corruption that is reinforced through both constitutional
reforms and “personalized” institutions that prevent him from getting investigated and protect his
interests (Phillips, 2017: 52). One of the institutions that serve the corruption of Erdoğan and his
entourage is the civilian secret service (Milli Istihbarat Teşkilati MIT), which according to
Erdoğan is “the most important state institution” (Matusiak, 2015: 32). The head of MIT, Hakan
Fidan, is considered one of Erdoğan’s closest friends, often referred to as his “mystery box” or
“person number two in the state”, since he is in charge of dealing with critical issues; for example,
the Kurdish opposition and the Gülen movement (Matusiak, 2015: 32). As mentioned earlier, post
the coup Fethullah Gülen was the main source of “disruption” for Erdoğan and the Turkish state;
thus, Gülenists were charged with treason and were referred to by the Turkish officials as
“terrorists” (Phillips, 2017: 48). Indeed, Erdoğan’s accusations reached foreign ambassadors, like
the former US Ambassador to Turkey, Francis J. Ricciardone, who was threatened and accused of
corruption for defending Fethullah Gülen from accusations of terrorism (Phillips, 2017:48). Other
foreign envoys were also condemned, like the Interior Minister of Israel, Efkan Ala. In fact, the
Turkish government clearly declared a forewarning, through the words of Ahmed Davutoglu,
“[We] will break the arm of anyone involved in graft, even if it’s our own brother” (Phillips,
2017:48).
“State of Emergency”
“It’s not only the person who pulls the trigger, but those who made that possible who
should also be defined as terrorists. There was no difference between a terrorist holding a gun or
a bomb and those who use their position and pen to serve the aims.”
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Mezzofiore, 2013)
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Erdoğan had the choice to reconcile with his opponents post the failed coup attempt; however, as
he has already shown in dealing with other incidents like the twin crises of 2013 (Gezi Park protests
and the 2013 corruption investigations), he chose to unleash his “inner-Stalin” (Phillips, 2017:
177). Indeed, the methods used by Erdoğan to justify the use of repression, and consolidate public
support depends on the narrative “with or against us” that has been continuously reinforced and in
Turkish society (Matusiak, 2015: 33). As emphasized by Yılmaz and Turner (2019), the coup was
the gate for Erdoğan to infuse conspiracy theories in the name of “saving the nation” and a means
to justify unprecedented abuse of human rights (Yılmaz and Turner, 2019: 693). In fact, the state
of emergency enforced post the coup transformed Turkey into a “giant gulag” in which the rule of
law was further undermined, legitimate forms of disagreement were denied, and massive purges
and arrests were striking (Phillips, 2017: 177). In that context, the government has further violated
freedoms of speech, demonstration, and assembly. Moreover, daily police operations have become
a means to convey a message to the public that any opposition will be considered a crime against
the regime, and the distinctive borderline between freedom of speech and crime could be
suspended (Yılmaz, 2020: 227). In other words, these emergency decrees created a “legal black
hole” that is dependent on a “system of arbitrary laws based on the exigencies of the emergency”
ignoring basic human and political rights and establishing a plebiscitary regime based on the
centralization of all powers to the president (Taş, 2015: 780; Yılmaz, 2020: 269). Indeed, the
numbers reflecting the level of repression after the failed coup attempt are unprecedented; as from
July 2016 to the present, an estimate of 50, 348 were dismissed, 96,885 were arrested, 500,650
were investigated on terrorism charges, 189 media outlets were shut down, 30003 private schools
and universities were closed, 4,463 judges and prosecutors were dismissed, and 6,021 academics
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lost their jobs (Turkey Purge) 36. In fact, not only the coup planners and those tied to the Gülen
movement were affected, but also all segments of the Turkish society on every level, which created
an atmosphere of fear and diminished any space of opposition (Bayulgen et al., 2018: 359).
Moreover, the statistics concerning the crackdown on the military are exceptional, as one-third of
the generals were detained, one-third of all the admirals were arrested, and thousands of officers
and soldiers were taken into custody (Phillips, 2017: 171).
Freedom of expression is another victim of Erdoğan’s policies as the government has been
increasing its pressure on media conglomerates and outlets to censor a wide array of news and to
silence opposition. Even though the tools to pressure and control the media outlets and journalists
existed before the AKP came to power, the party increasingly used those tools with unprecedented
frequency and force (Corke et al., 2014: 8). Post the Gezi Park protests, more than 70,000 URL
addresses were restricted, permanently; in addition, restrictions on social media networks were
imposed to reveal users’ data to state authorities (Matusiak, 2015: 35). As a result, the Freedom
House Foundation has classified Turkey as “not free” in terms of freedom of expression, and civil
and political rights (Freedom House). The detention and imprisonment of a large number of
journalists who criticized the government created an atmosphere of fear, as the numbers of arrest
warrants kept increasing to the extent of listing Turkey as the top jailer of journalists in the world,
ahead of Iran and China (Corke et al., 2014: 14). Indeed, some laws facilitated the process of
control for the government, like the Internet Law no.5651 of 2015, which empowered Turkey’s
Telecommunication Directorate (TIB) to allow the government to block websites “in the interest
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data collection on the post-coup purges, from Turkey Purge website, at http://turkeypurge.com/.
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of national security, the restoration of public order, and the prevention of crimes” (Phillips, 2017:
39). A month later in April 2015, the law was amended allowing the National Intelligence Agency
(MIT) to access personal data without court approval and it gave the MIT personnel and impunity
from legal violations committed in the course of their work (Phillips, 2017: 39). In addition, post
the failed coup, a new law endorsed sentences of up to nine years for individuals who publish or
leak intelligence material. Moreover, under Article 8 of Law 5651, the TIB continued monitoring
and blocking news websites, even though Article 8 only allows for the blockage of publications
related to gambling, prostitution, sexual abuse, and drug use (Phillips, 2017: 39). Accordingly, the
European Parliament (EP) issued a report condemning the harsh and repressive actions of the
government against the journalists, noting that Turkey is facing “serious backsliding” specifically
in terms of freedom of press, expression and opinion (Candar, 2016). The report, additionally,
criticizes the authoritarian tendencies of Erdoğan, and acknowledged the “rapidly deteriorating”
security condition in Turkey (Candar, 2016). Furthermore, Washington advised Turkey to follow
the rule of law and stop the arbitrary purges since it contradicts the principles of NATO and its
“respect to democracy” (Phillips, 2017: 171). Last but not least, another example of the
increasingly repressive and polarizing governmental style by Erdoğan is the response to the “peace
petition” conducted by more than 1400 academics calling an end to the “deliberate massacre and
deportation of Kurdish people” (Khalidi, 2016). The petition called for peace talks with the PKK,
stating “we will not be party to this crime”; however, Erdoğan accused the academics of betrayal
and responded: “We are not in the position to seek permission from the so-called academics. These
[people] should know their place, they commit the same crime as those who carry out massacres”
(Khalidi, 2016). Consequently, signatories were targeted and harassed, and others received death
threats (Khalidi, 2016).
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The AKP and Erdoğan have proved that their perception of being a democratic
party/government is nothing but a façade to preserve their electoral success and interests. Indeed,
the AKP programme emphasizes the importance of protecting fundamental rights and freedoms
(AKP official website: 1-13)37. Meanwhile, the reality is different as illustrated earlier in the
literature, the rule of law in Turkey has been systematically dismantled specifically since the July
15 coup attempt that narrowed the space for opposition, oppressed basic political freedoms, and
diminished confidence in state institutions. Moreover, even though one of the main political
principles of the AKP is “Democratization and transparency of the internal structures of the parties
that constitute the nucleus of an institution are the compelling necessities for the proper functioning
of the system”, the state institutions under the AKP have become highly politicized due to the
fusion of the state and the party, and the resort to massive electoral fraud and repression to stay in
power (AKP official website: 11; Esen and Gumuscu, 2016: 1585-1586). Similarly, Erdoğan has
used his electoral strength to permanently remove all the constraints on his power and use those
politicized state institutions against any potential threat; thus, additionally contradicting the party
principle that calls for “the separation of the powers [and] checks and balances shall be ensured
between the powers of the legislative, executive and judicial branches” (Castaldo, 2018: 482; AKP
official website: 12). The AKP and Erdoğan current political trajectory have the potential to
generate a more radical type of authoritarianism, yet it is still questionable whether the Turkish
military will remain obedient to the present government or decide to re-embrace its “guardian role
of secularism and Kemalism”. Some observers (as demonstrated in the former chapters) argue that
the military as an institution has already crumbled, which justifies the military’s obedience to
Erdoğan’s Islamic agenda. Nevertheless, others argue that the Turkish military is not forced to
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For more information about the AKP programme visit their official website:
https://www.akparti.org.tr/en/parti/party-programme/
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obey Erdoğan’s, but the military is voluntarily and strategically staying in barracks to maintain its
legitimacy in the eyes of the in the international community, especially that the civilian control of
the armed forces is a highly respected and strictly applied NATO doctrine. Accordingly, it greatly
unlikely that the Turkish military will plan a future coup against Erdoğan’s government.
Conclusion
This chapter examines the reversal to autocracy through an agency-based approach by
looking at literature on personalism and populism. The arguments presented to demonstrate the
strategies through which Erdoğan and the AKP used to consolidate their power. Through looking
at the empirical evidence behind the restructuring of the Turkish political and legal institutions,
military and media outlets, several outcomes are indicated. Firstly, the repressive government style
has led to the re-emergence of fear and self-censorship, and discouragement from expressing and
practicing socio-political rights. Secondly, the deployment of formal and informal mechanisms of
repression has led to unprecedented human rights violations and oppression of opposition. Thirdly,
all the aforementioned legal amendments and institutional changes have resulted in establishing
an institutional configuration of state power that eventually transformed state-citizen relationships;
thus, the capacity to challenge authoritarianism has become restrained. Finally, understanding the
logic behind the use of such strategies by Erdoğan is still controversial and the question remains:
Are those strategies mechanisms of defense or goals within themselves?
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Chapter V: Conclusion
After examining the literature on democratic backsliding and Turkey, the aim is to reach a
better understanding of why the process of democratic backsliding has taken place in Turkey
despite the de-politicization of the military, and also contribute to the understanding of using
autocratic measures in a more general manner. In regard, to evaluate the findings the three main
hypotheses are:
H1: Restrainaing the power of the military does not gurantee the survival of democracy.
H2: The autocratic policies by Erdoğan are influenced by the historical experience of
Turkey.
H3: The personalization of institutions is a key cause of democratic backsliding in Turkey.
Review of Findings
Hypothesis 1
The political developments in Turkey in the past 18 years, including the many crises that
have been unfolded since 2007, provide an important opportunity to study the phenomenon of
democratic backsliding in hybrid regimes that once had the potential to become more democratic.
Defying all theories in the literature, Turkey has turned visibly more authoritarian. In order to
explain this puzzle, the thesis focuses on the correlation between democratic backsliding vis-á-vis
the politicization of the military and the personalization of institutions. The literature examined,
proves that controlling the military by the civilian government, and eradicating its political
autonomy and tutelary powers is a crucial step for democracy; nevertheless, in the case of Turkey,
despite the government’s ability to change the civil-military relations- perceived as a positive
democratic development- the country has moved towards democratic backsliding. Even though
analysts of Turkish politics differ on the cause of this “authoritarian turn”, it is settled that there is
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a series of “turning points” not a specific single one in this context. As discussed in chapter two,
the first turning point is the constitutional reforms introduced between 1999 and 2010 to limit and
remove the military’s institutional mechanisms of power38, which partially proved to be effective
yet not fully successful in some incidents like the 2007 e-memorandum and the July 2016 failed
coup attempt. The military, indeed, is abiding by the constitutional reforms and acting within the
parameters of its legal rights. Another finding is the impact of punishment on the military’s
tendency to intervene. As was mentioned previously, the AKP government under Erdoğan
managed to unprecedently conduct trials and punishments against military officials, which have
gained significant criticism for their lack of transparency and failure to provide detailed judicial
explanations during sentencing. In regard, the military’s identity seems to have changed over time
as a result of the consecutive constitutional amendments, especially after the 2010 amendments
that enforced the change of the Internal Service Law to prevent military officials from having
constitutional grounds for carrying out coups against the civilian government. Thus, the end of the
military tutelary in Turkey is summed up in three steps; first, the implementation of legal reforms
that reduced the power of the military in the decision-making process; secondly, the delegitimization of the military’s intervention in politics; thirdly and lastly, the criminalization and
punishment of the military personnel in case of intervention. Accordingly, in assessing H1,
restrainaing the power of the military has not prevented the democratic backsliding in Turkey due
to the existence of other factors that paved the way for Erdoğan to adopt autocratic policies as
mentioned in chapter four.
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MGK, bureaucratic hierarchy, autonomy in promotion process, State Security Court, autonomy of defense
budget and TAF internal service.
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Hypothesis 2
In evaluating H2, a key finding discussed in chapter three is the incompletion of the
Turkish democratic transition demographically and institutionally, which accordingly reflects how
the democratic project in Turkey has never been fully consolidated and underscores how the
authoritarian tendencies have always existed and continue to be present in the Turkish political
system. Additionally, one could argue that Turkey has only changed from one type of
authoritarianism (under the rule of the military) to another one (under the rule of Erdoğan and the
AKP); accordingly, a new type of a deep state has emerged that is characterized by a governmental
structure that does not comply with the constitution and a fictious division of power among state
branches. Indeed, the present Turkish political system has become a representation of a one-man
rule whose powers are befalling to be unlimited. In fact, the development towards deeper forms of
authoritarianism has been increasingly reflected in a simultaneous personalized and rearrangement
of the state-society relations.
Hypothesis 3
As discussed in chapter four, the fusion of the state and the dominant ruling party has
generated deeply politicized state institutions created to serve the political and economic interests
of Erdoğan and the AKP. Today, Erdoğan and the AKP control the key state institutions: the
judiciary, the Turkish intelligence service, the police, the state bureaucracy, and partially the
military. In addition, Erdoğan has managed to control most of the media outlets; however, an
interesting component of this democratic backsliding/authoritarian turn is the lack of serious
opposition due to the growing repression and imprisonment of the opposing actors and the
legitimization of this authoritarian turn in the eyes of weak opposition parties. Another key finding
in chapter four is Erdoğan’s successful legitimation of authoritarian practices through the use of
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populist rhetoric in appealing to the citizens and opposition. The first step was the legitimation
construct of the “New Turkey” that ultimately opened the door for justifying more power grabs,
and developed a new pattern of identification for citizens and relevant groups. Indeed, specifically
after the failed July 15 coup, the key ideological narrative of the “New Turkey” proposed this logic
of “them against us” to eliminate both internal and external enemies. Consequently, in the
aftermath of the failed coup, the measures introduced under a state of emergency were essential to
decide who is with or against Erdoğan. Moreover, the media reproduced this rhetoric by
emphasizing the notion of “national security”. In addition, to strategies such as using permanent
anti-terror laws to punish dissident political groups, new forms of oppression were introduced that
deepened the ontological insecurity. The latter resulted in purposefully creating a form of Islamic
authoritarian populism that blurred the polarized Turkish society and mobilized Islamic and
nationalist sentiments to widen the electoral base of the AKP. Can Turkey emerge from its crisis?
Erdoğan’s personalization of institutions and alienation of checks and balances has definitely
rendered Turkey in a state of permanent political crisis. His success in elections does not indicate
his success in achieving the democracy promised by his political party for the people. Indeed,
currently in many hybrid regimes, modern authoritarians have succeeded in mastering the control
over electoral processes, creating an illusion of pluralism to maintain their power.
Last but not least, in examining H1, it is “valid” to say that restrainaing the power of the
military does not gurantee the survival of democracy due to the abuse and personalization of other
state institutions by partisan, which led to a new type of authoritarian tutelage. Secondly, in
examining H2, it is partially “valid” to say that the historical experience in Turkey has played a
role in the democratic backsliding process because other factors have also affected it like the
dependence on aggressive populist tactics, fractured opposition, and deep political polarization of
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the Turkish society. Finally, in examining H3, it is valid to say that the personalization of
institutions by Erdoğan is a key cause of democratic backsliding since currently politics in Turkey
is more centralized around the aspirations of one man who according to many Turkish scholars
has unprecedently consolidated power around his person in a way no other Turkish political leader
has ever done.

Concluding Outlook
I do believe that the limitations of my research prevent me from reaching definitive
conclusions. The first and biggest limitation that I experienced is the lack of understanding of the
Turkish language, which I believe would have been fruitful and allowed me to access archives,
gather field research, and gain a better understanding of Turkish society. In addition, I wanted to
analyze the rhetoric of military and government officials as well as Erdoğan’s in order to note the
shifts in statements that influence the Turkish population during different time spans. Finally, I
would like to have the opportunity to research this topic again and overcome the stated boundaries
hoping to offer a productive angle that examines democratic backsliding and authoritarian-turns
in other parts of the world.
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